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COPYRIGHT CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT’S PROPORTIONALITY PROBLEM 
MARGOT KAMINSKI

 
ABSTRACT 
 The United States is often considered to be the most speech-
protective country in the world.  Paradoxically, the features that 
have led to this reputation have created areas in which the United 
States is in fact less speech protective than other countries.  The 
Supreme Court’s increasing use of a categorical approach to the 
First Amendment has created a growing divide between the U.S. 
approach to reconciling copyright and free expression and the 
proportionality analysis adopted by most of the rest of the world. 
 In practice, the U.S. categorical approach to the First Amend-
ment minimizes opportunities for judicial oversight of copyright.  
Consequently, as corporations lobby for ever-increasing penal-
ties and enforcement mechanisms, the United States has fostered 
one of the world’s least speech-friendly criminal copyright re-
gimes.  The United States is exporting that regime, including its 
presumption that copyright is unrelated to freedom of expression.  
Instead of exporting flawed presumptions, the United States 
should reintegrate proportionality concepts into First Amendment 
doctrine to examine the proportionality of sanctions for speech 
that has functionally been deemed unprotected by the First 
Amendment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is often considered more speech-protective than any 
other country.  The First Amendment requires the government to recognize 
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that the remedy for bad speech is more speech, not punishment.
1
  Only a 
few categories of speech are historically not subject to First Amendment 
protection.
2
  Paradoxically, however, the Supreme Court’s First Amend-
ment doctrine, which is usually very speech-protective, has created substan-
tive areas where the United States is less speech-protective than other na-
tions. 
The United States, unlike other constitutional regimes, uses a tiered 
approach to constitutional analysis, familiar to many as the choice between 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.
3
  First 
Amendment doctrine offers a striking example of this tiered approach.  
With the exception of content-neutral speech regulations and areas covered 
by intermediate scrutiny,
4
 speech is either categorically protected in the 
United States or not protected at all.
5
  When speech falls into a category that 
is not protected, courts effectively abdicate judicial review of legislative 
sanctions.
6
 
                                                          
 1.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there 
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes 
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”); President Obama’s 
Remarks at the U.N. General Assembly, CNN (Sept. 25, 2012, 10:53 AM), 
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/25/president-obamas-prepared-remarks-at-the-u-n-general-
assembly (“[I]n a diverse society . . . the strongest weapon against hateful speech is not repression, 
it is more speech—the voices of tolerance that rally against bigotry and blasphemy, and lift up the 
values of understanding and mutual respect.  I know that not all countries in this body share this 
particular understanding of the protection of free speech—we recognize that.”). 
 2.  See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing the following catego-
ries of exceptions to First Amendment protection: “incite[ment of ] imminent lawless action, ob-
scenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called ‘fighting’ words, child pornog-
raphy, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government 
has the power to prevent” (citations omitted)). 
 3.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (1992). 
 4.  See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 788–89 (2007) (articulating the devel-
opment of intermediate scrutiny and the categories included within its analysis); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48–50 (1987) (explaining the Court’s 
content-neutral jurisprudence). 
 5.  See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explora-
tion of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (noting that “questions 
about the involvement of the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequen-
tial than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection”); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 296 (ob-
serving that the tiered system, “[w]hen applied in its strong bipolar form, such a two-tier system 
functions as a de facto categorical mode of analysis despite its nominal use of balancing rheto-
ric”).  But see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 397 (2009) (observing that First Amendment doctrine represents 
a blending of categorical and balancing approaches). 
 6.  See infra text Part III.A.  
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Copyright law is a casualty of the First Amendment’s on-off switch.7  
By contrast, courts around the world increasingly balance copyright against 
fundamental rights, including speech.
8
  This Article identifies the paradox 
that, at least in copyright law, the United States is less solicitous of speech 
interests than other countries and international courts.  The lack of speech 
protection in U.S. copyright jurisprudence results in large part from the 
American use of categorical review in free speech analysis.
9
  This Article 
partakes in comparative constitutionalism by comparing the U.S. approach 
to that of other countries and international bodies. 
The First Amendment’s on-off switch provides minimal judicial over-
sight of the copyright regime in the United States.
10
  Consequently, over the 
last two decades the United States has fostered one of the world’s least 
speech-friendly criminal copyright regimes.  This Article contributes to the 
sparse but growing literature on criminal copyright by addressing the role 
free trade agreements play in propagating the U.S. criminal copyright 
standard internationally.
11
 
Part I of this Article compares the proportionality analysis that most of 
the world’s constitutional courts use when reviewing laws implicating fun-
damental rights with the Supreme Court’s tiered framework of review in 
First Amendment doctrine.  Part II discusses how U.S. tiered review has 
functionally placed copyright law outside of First Amendment analysis, 
while international courts and other institutions have acknowledged that 
copyright laws can affect and impinge on free speech rights.  This Article 
                                                          
 7.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891 (2012) (concluding that Congress may take 
works out of the public domain and restore copyright protection, noting that “nothing in the histor-
ical record, congressional practice, or our own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amend-
ment solicitude”); see also Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Mak-
ing-up and Breaking-up, 43 IDEA 233, 236, 296–98 (2003) (discussing “the need to relocate the 
[copyright] conflict discourse in a constitutional framework”). 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See infra Part II.  
 10.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91 (refusing to apply heightened First Amendment scrutiny 
to the withdrawal of works from the public domain and clarifying that weak review applies to all 
copyright claims except when Congress alters “the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright protection,” 
meaning “the ‘idea/expression distinction’ and the ‘fair use’ defense”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to the Copyright Term Extension Act, 
which lengthened copyright’s term length). 
 11.  See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The 
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 
77 WASH. U. L. Q. 835, 837–38 (1999) (analyzing criminal copyright infringement in light of the 
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 785–87 
(2005) (exploring cost-benefit analysis as a method to defining the overcriminalization of copy-
right law). 
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examines the differences between the United States and international ap-
proaches, and concludes that the divide between them is growing. 
Part III addresses some of the problems created by the U.S. approach.  
There has been insufficient judicial oversight of copyright law in the United 
States to prevent its expansion, especially in the criminal realm.  As a con-
sequence of ever-increasing penalties and expansive criminal enforcement 
mechanisms, the U.S. copyright regime now raises substantial speech con-
cerns.  The regime can be overbroad, can result in collateral censorship, can 
give rise to chilling effects, and can allow for prior restraints on speech. 
Part IV explores how the United States is attempting to export its cop-
yright regime internationally in free trade agreements, and the recent rejec-
tion of those efforts in Europe through popular protest.  Finally, in Part V, 
this Article uses the example of criminal copyright law to identify patholo-
gies of the categorical approach and offer a suggestion.  The United States’ 
current efforts to export criminal copyright enforcement, along with a pre-
sumptively categorical approach to reconciling copyright and speech, con-
flict with public intuitions about free speech held by people around the 
world.  Instead, courts should take the opposite tact and reintegrate ele-
ments of proportionality analysis into First Amendment jurisprudence.  Do-
ing so would provide a more complete and nuanced understanding of free-
dom of expression and return the United States to its position as the most 
speech-protective country in the world. 
I.  PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS VERSUS THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH 
Most of the world’s constitutional courts employ a balancing test when 
reviewing laws that implicate the protection of fundamental rights.
12
  The 
balancing test, referred to as proportionality analysis, is triggered by a pri-
ma facie showing of rights infringement
13
 and resembles a weaker version 
of strict scrutiny.  Proportionality analysis involves four steps.  First, the 
court examines whether the government has a legitimate purpose for the 
law.
14
  Second, it examines whether the means employed are rationally re-
lated to that legitimate purpose.
15
  Third, it deploys a least-restrictive-means 
test to ensure that the law does not curtail the fundamental right any more 
                                                          
 12.  See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitu-
tionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74 (2008) (“By the end of the 1990s, virtually every 
effective system of constitutional justice in the world . . . had embraced the main tenets of [pro-
portionality analysis].”). 
 13.  Id. at 75. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 2014] COPYRIGHT CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 591 
 
than is necessary.
16
  Finally, the court balances the benefits of the narrowly 
tailored law against the costs incurred by the infringement of the right, giv-
en the facts of the case.
17
 
Under proportionality analysis, courts may end up balancing one fun-
damental right against another.  A court typically considers how seriously a 
given right has been implicated by a case and balances the depth of this in-
cursion against the strength of the government’s invoked interest.18  The 
more extensive the government’s incursion into the core of a given right, 
the more serious the government’s purpose must be.19  Sometimes the gov-
ernment invokes the protection of one right as justification for encroaching 
on another.
20
  The court then weighs the two rights, considering the strength 
of the right protected and the severity of government encroachment onto the 
right being impinged.
21
 
The United States, by contrast, uses a tiered system of review for 
rights violations.
22
  The court chooses which type of review to apply: strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review.
23
  Each tier, at least 
on first blush, contains elements of a balancing test; strict scrutiny, for ex-
ample, requires that regulations be narrowly tailored to a compelling gov-
ernment interest.
24
  But as the U.S. tiered doctrine has developed, the tiers 
have become increasingly rigid.
25
  Strict scrutiny, especially in First 
Amendment doctrine, is now famously close to being “fatal in fact.”26  As a 
                                                          
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 75–76. 
 18.  Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review 
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 837 (2011). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See id. (comparing a court’s ability to recognize a person’s consumption of child pornog-
raphy as free expression, while allowing the government to regulate the sexual exploitation of 
children against the protection of political protest from state regulation). 
 21.  Id. at 837–38 (finding that the right to free expression in child pornography is minimal in 
comparison to the right of political speech, which is considered a fundamental right). 
 22.  Id. at 836, 838; see also Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why 
Everywhere but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 297 (2012) (explaining that generally, 
the United States protects rights categorically but also uses a “means-end analysis that is more-or-
less through proportionality analysis”). 
 23.  Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 836. 
 24.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 25.  Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 837. 
 26.  Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  But see Adam Winkler, Fa-
tal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 793, 795–96, 844 (2006) (pointing out that in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 237 (1995), the Supreme Court “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 
‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’” and showing that strict scrutiny is not always deadly, but that it 
is “most fatal in the area of free speech”). 
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consequence, U.S. courts often do not balance rights against each other; in-
stead, their decisions frequently turn on which standard of review they 
choose to apply.
27
 
A.  The First Amendment’s Categorical Approach 
The Supreme Court’s approach to the First Amendment is a noted ex-
ample of U.S. constitutional exceptionalism and the U.S. preference for 
tiered review.
28
  In fact, the Supreme Court initially created strict scrutiny in 
a First Amendment case.
29
  Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black dif-
fered over whether the Court should use a balancing test or an absolutist 
approach to free speech.
30
  The Court created strict scrutiny as a way to rec-
oncile these two approaches.
31
  Strict scrutiny, as it was first introduced, 
functioned as a weighted balancing test.  It thus represented a compromise 
between absolutism and balancing.
32
  Strict scrutiny as originally formulat-
ed allowed the court to perform a balancing test, but put a heavy thumb on 
the scale in favor of the importance of free speech.
33
  Therefore, early forms 
of strict scrutiny more closely resembled proportionality analysis.
34
 
Strict scrutiny, however, evolved from being a proportionality test to 
more of an on-off switch.
35
  Content-based regulations of speech are now all 
subject to strict scrutiny and, therefore, are almost always found to be un-
constitutional.
36
  As many know, however, the First Amendment does not 
unconditionally protect all speech.  The Court has developed ways to devi-
                                                          
 27.  See infra Part II. 
 28.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scruti-
ny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 361–80 (2006) (discussing the “Birth of the Compelling State In-
terest Test and Strict Scrutiny” as part of the First Amendment jurisprudence in 1963, when used 
in three opinions written by “high-protectionist Justices Brennan and Goldberg”). 
 30.  Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the absolutist approach), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524–25 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing the balancing test of “competing in-
terests”). 
 31.  Siegel, supra note 29, at 375. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 376. 
 34.  See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 841 (noting that “[a]s we found with respect to 
earlier versions of strict scrutiny, American judges considered [proportionality analysis] to be in-
herent parts of the judicial repertoire”). 
 35.  See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 36.  But see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728–29, 2731 (2010) 
(upholding a content-based speech regulation under strict scrutiny because national interest in 
combating terrorism was sufficiently important and law was narrowly tailored to further that im-
portant end). 
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ate from the tiered review’s protective framework in order to arrive at the 
conclusion that some speech is not protected.
37
 
The following are a few examples of how the Court arrives at a non-
speech-protective decision within current First Amendment doctrine.  The 
Court is often uncomfortable applying a pure tiered review, even in the First 
Amendment context.
38
  First, there are some areas of law that clearly apply 
to speech but are not covered by the First Amendment, such as securities 
regulation, antitrust law, and bans on criminal solicitation.
39
  Once the 
Court finds itself in a topic covered by the First Amendment, one approach 
it uses to get around the First Amendment is to label certain activities unex-
pressive, and thus not subject to First Amendment protection.
40
  Another 
way courts get around strict scrutiny to subject speech regulation to light 
intermediate scrutiny.
41
  A third approach to circumventing the First 
Amendment is to determine that the government regulation at hand is in 
fact content-neutral, not content-based; this triggers intermediate scrutiny.
42
  
A final approach creates whole categories of speech that are recognized as 
unprotected, even though they are also recognized as speech.
43
  Thus, the 
substance of a First Amendment decision usually involves following a se-
ries of rules, logical or not, that categorize both the type of regulation and 
the type of expression, rather than weighing the strength of the speaker’s 
speech right against the strength of the governmental interest.
44
 
I do not want to overstate my claim as to the First Amendment’s cate-
gorical nature; within intermediate scrutiny cases, for instance, the Court is 
                                                          
 37.  See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 836. 
 38.   The Court’s multiplying approaches to taking speech outside of First Amendment pro-
tection exemplify what Mathews and Sweet call the pathology of doctrinal instability.  Mathews & 
Sweet, supra note 18, at 836–37.  Doctrinal instability occurs when U.S. courts find themselves 
needing to escape from the bifurcated results created by tiered review.  Id. at 847.  Mathews and 
Sweet posit that courts then create intermediate tiers of review to engage in more subtle judicial 
reasoning resembling proportionality analysis, such as intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 846–47.  
 39.  See Schauer, supra note 5, at 1771. 
 40.  See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“Cohen’s absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech,” and not 
covered by the First Amendment); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–78 (1968) (creat-
ing the test for determining when conduct is expressive, but finding that the government could 
constitutionally regulate the burning of a draft card). 
 41.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (finding that the “appro-
priate standard by which to evaluate the constitutionality of must-carry is the intermediate level of 
scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech”).  
 42.  Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48–49 (1986). 
 43.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See Schauer, supra note 5, at 1769 (noting that “[w]hen the First Amendment does show 
up, the full arsenal of First Amendment rules, principles, standards, distinctions . . . becomes 
available”); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 296 (observing that outcomes can be determined at the 
threshold of determining which test is applied, “[b]ut this is not real balancing”). 
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likely to engage in real balancing of speech and other values.
45
  The trou-
bling phenomenon I identify here, however, is that when language falls into 
one of the categories of speech that is covered by the First Amendment but 
receive no First Amendment protection—such as fraud, true threats, or ob-
scenity—proportionality analysis can allow foreign and international courts 
to be more speech-protective than the U.S. categorical approach conven-
tionally permits.
46
  Proportionality analysis does not guarantee more protec-
tion, but “[y]ou simply cannot do everything with boxes that you can do 
with balancing.”47 
Today’s Supreme Court is particularly enamored with the categorical 
approach in its First Amendment cases.
48
  In recent cases, the Court has ad-
hered to the “historical and traditional categories” of exceptions to First 
Amendment protection, refused to apply a balancing test to create new ex-
ceptions, and applied strict scrutiny.
49
  The Court explained that the “vast 
realm of free speech and thought always protected in our tradition can still 
thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to those categories and rules.”50 
The two-tiered and categorical approach to First Amendment protec-
tion has some distinct advantages.
51
  Formalism is highly speech-protective 
                                                          
 45.  See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–35 (2001) (weighing the public interest 
in disclosure against the privacy harms done to the victim of a wiretap and finding protection un-
der intermediate scrutiny); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 
183–84 (1999) (finding that the promotion of legal gambling constitutes commercial speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny); see also Sullivan, supra 
note 5, at 297 (pointing out that in contrast to strict scrutiny and rationality review, “intermediate 
scrutiny is an overtly balancing mode”). 
 46.  But see Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 869–78 
(2005) (proposing a containment strategy for regulations applied to unprotected speech that re-
quires courts to ask whether the content-based regulation of unprotected speech relates substan-
tially to harm at which the larger unprotected category is directed, and whether the regulation 
threatens speech not likely to be restricted through the general category). 
 47.  Sullivan, supra note 3, at 308–09 (discussing the practical differences between the cate-
gorization and balancing techniques). 
 48.  See id. at 306 (noting the “active controversy” over categorization and balancing in con-
stitutional law). 
 49.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (noting that “content-based re-
strictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few ‘his-
toric and traditional categories’” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010))); 
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only 
to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”); 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002) (refusing to extend the First Amendment 
exception for child pornography to digital child pornography). 
 50.  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
 51.  See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
128 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that “[t]he case before us presents 
the opportunity to adhere to a surer test for content-based cases and to avoid using an unnecessary 
formulation, one with the capacity to weaken central protections of the First Amendment”); see 
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when courts use it to refuse to create new categories of unprotected speech, 
as the Supreme Court has recently done.
52
  By creating categories of pro-
tected and unprotected speech, categorical analysis also gives rise to fewer 
borderline cases, and thus operates as a more predictable and less costly 
system for most defendants.
53
 
The Court’s preference for categorical analysis is supported by sub-
stantial historical examples of the inherent flaws of balancing tests.  First 
Amendment doctrine once required balancing.  Under the “clear-and-
present-danger test,” courts were required to make an inquiry into the “im-
minence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utter-
ance” and balance the “character of the evil” and likelihood of its occur-
rence “against the need for free and unfettered expression.”54  The use of 
this test to defeat First Amendment claims in the 1950s gave First Amend-
ment balancing a bad reputation among U.S. speech advocates.
55
 
The United States, however, has not always been against balancing.  
Additionally, the First Amendment today may not be as categorical as the 
current Court assumes it to be.
56
  The current Court’s reliance on formalism 
neglects to consider historical nuances of First Amendment application.
57
 
In the past, the Court has circumvented First Amendment formalism in 
several ways.  It has reached within unprotected categories of speech to re-
fine the boundaries of historically prohibited categories of speech.
58
  It has 
                                                          
also GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 396–410 (2004) (discussing the unprecedented First 
Amendment activity for the Supreme Court as a result of the Cold War, specifically focusing on 
the significance of Dennis v. United States).  
 52.  See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470–72; Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
 53.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733–35 (2011) (applying Ste-
vens in an easy and straightforward manner, and firmly rejecting a balancing test as “startling and 
dangerous,” holding instead that the categorical approach is better because it clearly articulates the 
details of the obscenity exception to the First Amendment).  
 54.  Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842–43 (1978).  The clear-and pre-
sent-danger test was established in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which found that 
the government could regulate Communist speech advocating the overthrow of the government at 
some indistinct time in the future.  Id. at 515–17. 
 55.  See, e.g., Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 
1428–49 (1962) (arguing that the clear-and-present danger balancing test has been over applied 
and overused); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 249–50 (1961) (claiming that the Dennis opinion, which argued against an absolutist inter-
pretation of exceptions to First Amendment rights, was predicated on an erroneous conception of 
the absolutist interpretation). 
 56.  Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 813–14. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  New York Times Co.v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (explaining that “libel can 
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations”); see also Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 18–20, 23–24 (1973) (observing that obscenity is not constitutionally protected, but rec-
ognizing the need for “standards . . . used to identify obscene material”). 
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banned regulation of speech within the unprotected categories when the 
regulation was done for a purpose unrelated to why those categories of 
speech were banned.
59
  In addition, the Court has rejected the state’s use of 
“any way deemed necessary” to go after speech that did fall into one of the 
unprotected categories.
60
 
On the surface, current First Amendment doctrine seems to require 
tiered review combined with an analysis of categorical exceptions to First 
Amendment protection.
61
  At a closer glance, however, this makeshift two-
prong approach is disintegrating, which demonstrates a possible inherent 
doctrinal instability.
62
  It thus may be time to develop a less ad hoc ap-
proach to the regulation of speech that falls into an unprotected category. 
Courts forego First Amendment formalism in favor of balancing tests 
in a number of areas.  The most prominent example is the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of its use of intermediate scrutiny.
63
  When the Court wants to 
balance speech against other values, it employs intermediate scrutiny.  The 
John Doe standard developed by lower courts, which is used to protect 
anonymous speakers from having their identity revealed in frivolous law-
suits, is an example of the regular use of a balancing test.
64
  The John Doe 
standard requires courts to balance the speaker’s First Amendment rights 
against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, among other fac-
                                                          
 59.  R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (finding that even though the govern-
ment can regulate true threats and fighting words, it cannot designate a content-based subcategory 
for regulation within categorically unprotected speech). 
 60.  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559–63 (1969) (rejecting the idea that since obscenity 
is not constitutionally protected, states are free to deal with it in “any way deemed necessary”). 
 61.  See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 301 (noting that “[t]wo-tier review, like overtly taxonomic 
or categorical analysis . . . uses classification at the threshold to cut off further serious debate . . . . 
Intermediate scrutiny requires far more evaluative work after the threshold has been crossed.”). 
 62.  See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 837. 
 63.  See Blocher, supra note 5, at 391–92 (referring to intermediate scrutiny as “the Test That 
Ate Everything”). 
 64.  See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn 
from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374–1384 (2009) (describing the evolution of the John 
Doe standard and the First Amendment doctrines created to protect the anonymity of Internet 
speech in libel suits). 
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tors.
65
  Trademark jurisprudence also contains a balancing test that involves 
free speech.
66
 
In recent years, however, the Court has further entrenched First 
Amendment formalism and the categorical approach.
67
  That formalism has 
surprising consequences with respect to the First Amendment’s relative pro-
tectiveness of categorically unprotected speech.  A purely formalistic ap-
proach to the First Amendment runs the danger of rejecting all speech that 
falls into a historically unprotected category, without considering the cir-
cumstances or proportionality of the state’s response to the speech.68  Even 
categorically unprotected speech can have at least some value; moreover, it 
can be used as a vehicle for restricting protected speech.
69
 
B.  International Free Speech and Proportionality Analysis 
In contrast to the United States, most other countries use proportionali-
ty analysis to examine restrictions on speech rights.
70
  Proportionality anal-
ysis sometimes requires balancing speech against other rights, which can 
lead to excessive judicial deference to legislatures.
71
  For borderline cases, 
however, proportionality analysis can be more protective than categorical 
analysis because it always requires balancing the purpose of regulations 
against the right of the speaker to speak.
72
  There are no categories of 
speech that fall outside of the balancing test entirely, with the exception of 
four types of expression that states are actively required to prohibit.
73
 
                                                          
 65.  Id. at 1376–77 (“[C]ourts are beginning to converge on a set of standards to balance the 
right to speak anonymously with the rights of those injured by the defamatory anonymous 
speech.”); see also Jocelyn Hanamirian, The Right To Remain Anonymous: Anonymous Speakers, 
Confidential Sources and the Public Good, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119, 120 (2012) (stating that 
courts must “‘balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against 
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anony-
mous defendant’s identity’” (quoting Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001))). 
 66.  Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property 
and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41–44 (2013). 
 67.  See supra Part I. 
 68.  See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to 
the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 997, 1027–44 (2012) (arguing that the Court 
should take a penalty-sensitive approach to speech analysis). 
 69.  Kitrosser, supra note 46, at 848. 
 70.  Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptional-
sim, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 396–97 (2008). 
 71.  T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 465, 483–487 (2005). 
 72.  Id. at 470 (citing Soering v. U.K., 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 110 (1989)). 
 73.  U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 80, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/17 (June 4, 2012) (by 
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Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) exemplifies the international use of proportionality analysis to 
protect freedom of expression.
74
  Article 19 protects the right to freedom of 
expression, including the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds.”75  The Article 19 right applies to all media, includ-
ing the Internet.
76
  It is explicitly subject, however, to “certain re-
strictions.”77 
Any restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 19 are subject 
to a three-part test familiar to courts around the world.
78
  The three-part test 
mandates that any speech restriction must be provided for by law, protect a 
legitimate interest, and be both necessary and the “least restrictive means” 
required to protect that interest.
79
  The three-part test is a form of propor-
tionality analysis. 
Courts around the world have applied this three-part test when ad-
dressing exceptions to freedom of expression; this application can be seen 
in two regional human rights treaties.
80
  The European Court of Human 
                                                          
Frank La Rue) [hereinafter La Rue 2012] (referencing report A/66/290).  States are required under 
international law to prohibit the following: child pornography; incitement to genocide; incitement 
to discrimination through advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred; and incitement to ter-
rorism.  Id. 
 74.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(2), opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], availa-
ble at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.  The ICCPR, as ratified by 
the Senate, is non-self-executing and therefore is not binding law in the United States. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177993. 
 77.  ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 19(3).  The restrictions include “(a) [f]or respect of the rights 
or reputations of others; (b) [f]or the protection of national security or of public order (ordre pub-
lic), or of public health or morals.”  Id.  
 78.  Gunn, supra note 71, at 467–68 (describing how the proportionate measure must be satis-
fied by three criteria). 
 79.  ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 19(3); see also U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 24, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue) [hereinafter La Rue 2011], 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf. 
 80.  See, e.g., Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms art. 10.2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered in force Sept. 
3, 1953), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 13.2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr4.html; Organization of African Unity, Af-
rican Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, available 
at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/; see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, ¶ 49 (1979) (requiring the law to be accessible and “formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct”); Lingens v. Austria, App. 
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Rights (“ECHR”) has explained that exceptions to freedom of expression 
“must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be 
convincingly established.”81  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has noted that a restriction on freedom of expression “must be so framed as 
not to limit the right . . . more than is necessary.”82 
The United States is an outlier, as compared to the rest of the world, in 
using a predominantly categorical approach to speech rights.
83
  Usually, the 
categorical approach means that the United States is more speech-protective 
than other countries because most speech regulation is subject to strict scru-
tiny, which is usually fatal-in-fact.
84
  But for the liminal cases, the categori-
cal approach can be less protective than a universal balancing test.
85
  Com-
paratively, the United States is underprotective of categorically rejected 
speech.
86
  Once a category of speech has been deemed unprotected, the 
United States allows liability for all speech within the boundaries of that 
categorical carve-out.
87
  The United States fails to provide judicial oversight 
over the type and scope of sanctions applied to unprotected speech.
88
 
II.  COPYRIGHT AS A CARVE-OUT, OR WEIGHED AGAINST SPEECH 
Copyright law is an example of one such carve-out.
89
  First Amend-
ment doctrine has been notoriously blind to the speech problems created by 
copyright law.
90
  Intellectual property and the First Amendment “pull in op-
                                                          
No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, ¶¶ 39–40 (1986) (holding that there must be a “‘pressing so-
cial need’” for the speech restriction, the reasons given must be “‘relevant and sufficient,’” and the 
restriction must be proportionate to the aim pursued (internal citations omitted)). 
 81.  Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 843, 865 (1992).                          
 82.  Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Jour-
nalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 46 (Nov. 13, 1985), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4e.htm.  
 83.  See Gardbaum, supra note 70, at 397. 
 84.  See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 295–96. 
 85.  See id. at 295 (discussing how categorical and balancing approaches have oscillated in 
First Amendment law).   
 86.  Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitu-
tional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 918 (2009).   
 87.  Id.   
 88.  See Coenen, supra note 68, at 994 (“[S]ome forms of expression warrant neither total 
immunization against nor total exposure to the threat of government-sponsored sanction.”).  
 89.  See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or 
Uneasy Allies, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 833–35 (2010) (describing the conflict between the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment as the threat of possible copyright infringement ac-
tion, which may impermissibly deter free speech). 
 90.  For criticisms of the U.S. approach to copyright law and free speech, see Mark A. Lem-
ley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 
DUKE L.J. 147, 165–69 (1998) (describing the significance of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
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posite directions.”91  As a speech restriction, copyright law “restricts [one] 
from writing, painting, publicly performing, or otherwise communicating 
what [one] please[s].”92 
Rather than recognizing the speech implications of copyright law in 
the two recent decisions of Eldred v. Ashcroft
93
 and Golan v. Holder,
94
 the 
Supreme Court instead applied “only a mild form of rational basis review” 
to copyright policy.  As long as “Congress has not altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection,” copyright policy is effectively found to 
be categorically immune from First Amendment scrutiny.
95
  Petitioners 
urged the Court in Eldred to find that an extension of the copyright term 
was unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny, but the Court refused to 
apply intermediate scrutiny to copyright policy to find the term extension 
disproportionate.
96
  The Court also refused to review copyright policy under 
a “congruence and proportionality” standard that it had established in cases 
addressing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
97
 
The First Amendment thus treats copyright policy with a strikingly 
formalistic approach.
98
  The Court has held that copyright regulation is con-
tent-neutral and usually subject to a weak rational basis review, so it is not 
scrutinized under the First Amendment.
99
  Functionally, Eldred and Golan 
put most copyright regulations outside of First Amendment protection, as 
though copyright questions were an unprotected category of speech.
100
 
                                                          
Nation Enterprises, and its effect on enjoining free speech); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37–39 (2001) (explaining that 
although the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent Clause explicitly empowers Congress to enact a 
copyright statute, copyright is still vulnerable to First Amendment challenge); Jed Rubenfeld, The 
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 12–30 (2002) (com-
menting on the four principal explanations for copyright law’s insulation from First Amendment 
review); and Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 553–55 (2004) (identifying other examples of speech-
protective limits of copyright). 
 91.  Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 3. 
 92.  Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 165–66. 
 93.  537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 94.  132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 95.  Eldred, 537 at 221; see Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 10 (quoting Golan, 
132 S. Ct. at 890–91). 
 96.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199–208. 
 97.  Id. at 217–18. 
 98.  NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 170 (2010) (calling the intersec-
tion of First Amendment and copyright doctrine “judicial formalism at its worst”). 
 99.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94; NETANEL, supra note 98, at 59 (rejecting the ad hoc balanc-
ing of social costs and benefits with regard to content-based regulations).  
 100.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 844; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94. 
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By contrast, foreign and transnational courts and institutions explicitly 
weigh copyright laws against free expression rights.
101
  Multiple European 
national courts have weighed copyright protection against the right of free-
dom of expression and information guaranteed in Article 10 of the 
ECHR.
102
 
In 2013, the ECHR held that copyright must be balanced against the 
right to freedom of expression established in Article 10.
103
  The ECHR did 
not perform a balancing test because it found that French judicial authorities 
had done so properly.
104
  The ECHR explained that national courts will be 
granted broad deference in balancing conflicting rights and interests, such 
as the right to property and the right to free expression, especially where the 
speech involved is commercial in nature.
105
  The court, however, recognized 
the applicability of Article 10’s freedom of expression to a copyright 
case.
106
  The ECHR explained that while freedom of expression is subject to 
exceptions, any exception must be strictly interpreted and the reason for it 
must be convincingly established.
107
 
From an international perspective, two non-U.S. institutions have, us-
ing proportionality analysis, recently recognized that copyright enforcement 
can impermissibly impinge on free speech.  In 2009, the Constitutional 
Council of the French Republic subjected the new French copyright en-
                                                          
 101.  See Antoine Buyse, Copyright vs Freedom of Expression Judgment, ECHR BLOG (Jan. 
22, 2013), http://echrblog.blogspot.in/2013/01/copyright-vs-freedom-of-expression.html (noting 
that the European Court of Human Rights held that “a conviction or any other judicial decision 
based on copyright law, restricting a person’s or an organisation’s freedom of expression, must be 
pertinently motivated as being necessary in a democratic society, apart from being prescribed by 
law and pursuing a legitimate aim”). 
 102.  See id. (citing Plesner Joensen v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, [2011] E.C.D.R. 14 
(Neth.)).  In 1997, the Austrian Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the conflict between cop-
yright and free expression, under Article 10(2) of the ECHR.  Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Su-
preme Court] Dec. 1997, docket No. 4 Ob 361/97, 9 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN 
OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), reprinted in 1998 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 896–98 (1998)(Ger.).  In 2001, after the UK had 
imported several sections of the ECHR into domestic law, the British Court of Appeal acknowl-
edged that “rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into 
conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act.”  Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd, 
[2001] EWCA (Civ) 1142, [45] (Eng.).  
 103.  Ashby Donald and Others v. France, App. No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th Section) at 
¶40 (2013). 
 104.  Id. ¶¶ 42, 43. 
 105.  Id. ¶ 39 (noting the increased deference to lower courts when the speech is commercial 
speech); id. ¶ 40 (noting that it is difficult to balance conflicting rights, and thus the margin of ap-
preciation—the degree of deference to the domestic court—is important). 
 106.  Id. ¶ 34 (recognizing the applicability of Article 10 to the copyrighted photographs at 
issue). 
 107.  Id. ¶ 38(i). 
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forcement regime, the HADOPI, to constitutional review.
108
  The Council 
held that the regime of graduated response, also known as three strikes, 
must be subject to judicial oversight because it implicated users’ privacy 
and speech rights.  The French Parliament may lay down laws to reconcile 
property with freedom of expression, but such laws must be proportionate 
to their purpose.
109
  Furthermore, the Council found that in view of the 
guarantee of freedom of expression and the proportionality requirement, the 
French Parliament was not at liberty to vest its power in an administrative 
authority outside of judicial review.
110
  The Court found that the proposed 
legal process and burdens of proof were not adequately protective of the 
free expression right.
111
 
Similarly, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opin-
ion and Expression, Frank La Rue, found that certain copyright enforce-
ment policies disproportionately harm speech rights.
112
  The Special Rap-
porteur is appointed by the United Nations Secretary General to report and 
advise on rights violations.
113
  In 2011, La Rue found that although expres-
sion “may be legitimately restricted under international human rights law,” 
any restrictions, including copyright enforcement, must be subject to the 
Article 19 three-part test.
114
  The report expressed alarm at “proposals to 
disconnect users from Internet access if they violate intellectual property 
rights.”115  Such proposals would violate Article 19’s proportionality re-
quirement.  The report also expressed concern over the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), a copyright enforcement agreement.116  La 
Rue remained “watchful about the treaty’s eventual implications for inter-
mediary liability and the right to freedom of expression.”117   
                                                          
 108.  Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC, June 10, 
2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/2009/decisions-par-date/2009/2009-580-dc/decision-n-2009-
580-dc-du-10-juin-2009.42666.html. English version available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2009580DC2009_580dc.pdf. 
 109.  Id. ¶ 15 (“Any restrictions placed on the exercising of such freedom must necessarily 
be . . . proportionate to the purpose it is sought to achieve.”). 
 110.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 111.  Id. ¶¶ 17–19.  A later review of the revised HADOPI laws, which involved a court sys-
tem, found that due process had adequately been established and free speech rights were no longer 
disproportionately violated.  Id. 
 112.  La Rue 2011, supra note 79. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. ¶ 24. 
 115.  Id. ¶ 49. 
 116.  Id. ¶ 50. 
 117.  Id. 
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There is thus a growing divide between the United States’ approach to 
reconciling copyright and free expression, and the approach used by other 
countries.
118
 
III. FLAWS IN THE U.S. APPROACH 
Focusing on the nature of the free speech regime instead of copyright’s 
judicial exceptionalism illuminates a striking feature of the U.S. approach: 
in the United States, once a category of speech falls outside of the First 
Amendment’s protection, the legislature may apply any variety of sanc-
tions, functionally unchecked by judicial scrutiny.
119
  The First Amendment 
generally does not distinguish between civil and criminal liability, or be-
tween degrees of severity of sanctions for categorically unprotected 
speech—it is a “penalty-neutral” approach.120 
A proportionality analysis of speech, by contrast, is sensitive to wheth-
er a regulation is criminal or civil.  In both 2011 and 2012, La Rue ex-
pressed deep concern over the criminalization of online expression.
121
  The 
2011 Special Rapporteur’s report stated that “[i]mprisoning individuals for 
seeking, receiving and imparting information and ideas can rarely be justi-
fied as a proportionate measure to achieve one of the legitimate aims under 
article 19 [of the ICCPR].”122  Indeed, criminalization is problematic as an 
enforcement method because a state’s restriction “must be proven as neces-
sary and the least restrictive means required to achieve the purported 
aim.”123 
As a result, courts will always be more skeptical of the criminalization 
of speech than of civil sanctions.
124
  Furthermore, the international intuition 
                                                          
 118.  This Article is not the first to observe that the United States and other countries approach 
copyright differently.  In attempting to explain the discrepancy between the U.S. and European 
treatment of copyright and free speech, Birnhack focused on the different theoretical foundations 
for copyright regimes in different countries, namely the United States internal approach, which 
uses fair use and other doctrinal safety valves to reconcile free speech and copyright, and the Eu-
ropean external approach, which weighs copyright against other values.  Birnhack, supra note 7, 
at 297.  This Article focuses, instead, on the different features of applicable free speech regimes. 
 119.  See Coenen, supra note 68, at 994 (discussing the “penalty-neutral” approach to free 
speech adjudication in the United States, where speech is “either protected, in which case it may 
not be punished, or unprotected, in which case it may be punished to a very great degree”); see 
also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1517 (1998) (observing that the First Amendment does not generally “impose[] limits on the se-
verity of punishment for speech that the government is entitled to criminalize”). 
 120.  See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 121.  La Rue 2012, supra note 73, ¶ 64; La Rue 2011, supra note 79, ¶ 34. 
 122.  La Rue 2011, supra note 79, ¶ 36. 
 123.  Id. ¶ 69. 
 124.  Id. 
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is that human rights law protects the “vertical relationships” between the 
state and individuals more strongly than private “horizontal relationships” 
between individuals.
125
  Thus, criminalization of speech is particularly sus-
pect because it directly involves the enforcement power of the state against 
the individual.  Criminalization also invokes the powerful stigma of official 
state disapproval, which is far stronger in criminal law than, for example, a 
system of agency-administered fines. 
The U.S. approach to the First Amendment does not take into account 
differences between criminal and civil sanctions.
126
  This feature of First 
Amendment doctrine has remained relatively overlooked because the Court 
often throws out civil speech laws and, thus, has not needed to consider ex-
plicitly whether criminal speech sanctions are more problematic than civil 
ones.
127
 
In the United States, most speech regulation is not permissible even in 
the civil context.
128
  As a consequence, First Amendment doctrine, unlike 
international freedom of expression, fails to decry the criminalization of 
speech as disproportionate to all but the most serious government aims.
129
  
While states within the United States have repealed their criminal libel 
laws, no clear First Amendment rule tells states they cannot criminalize li-
bel if they define it in line with the definitions sanctioned in First Amend-
ment case law.
130
 
In fact, the Supreme Court, in dicta, has made observations that equate 
criminal and civil sanctions.
131
  The Court observed that “the [f]ear of dam-
age awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecu-
tion under a criminal statute.”132  Some forms of civil regulation can create 
“hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reli-
                                                          
 125.  P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 247–48 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 
2002); Affaire Tolstoy Miloslavsky C. Royaume-Uni [Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom], 
20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442 (1996). 
 126.  See Coenen, supra note 68, at 994–96 (explaining that “the standard method of First 
Amendment analysis is penalty-neutral” and, when the Court “has flirted with penalty-sensitive 
review, [it] has proceeded in an ad hoc manner”). 
 127.  See id. at 994 (describing First Amendment litigation as a “winner-take-all affair”). 
 128.  See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (reviewing the case 
“against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). 
 129.  See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 130.  Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment 
Laws, and “Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 751–53 (2013). 
 131.  New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277–78. 
 132.  Id. at 277. 
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ance upon the criminal law.”133  The Court then concluded that “[w]hat a 
State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is 
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel,” effectively equating civil 
and criminal liability.
134
 
Despite this statement of equivalence, the Court has struggled with an 
intuition that criminal prosecution is more problematic than civil sanc-
tions.
135
  This discomfort is an instance of the doctrinal instability created 
by the First Amendment’s categorical approach.136  In one case, the Court 
observed that “a law imposing criminal penalties on protected speech is a 
stark example of speech suppression.”137  In another case, the Court clari-
fied that a First Amendment holding permitting administrative sanctions of 
speech might not extend to criminal prosecutions.
138
  The Court also noted 
its “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penal-
ties.”139  Further, the Court has reasoned that when a case did not involve a 
criminal statute, the consequences of its decision were “not constitutionally 
severe.”140 
The Supreme Court came closest to recognizing that criminal sanc-
tions might be more problematic than civil sanctions in Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties Union.
141
  In Reno, Justice Stevens stated several times that 
criminal sanctions are more troubling than civil sanctions.
142
  Concluding 
that the statute at hand was not narrowly tailored, the Court explained that 
“the risk of criminal sanctions ʽhovers over each content provider, like the 
proverbial sword of Damocles.ʼ”143  Criminal statutes are problematic be-
cause of the harsh penalties they carry, as well as the social stigma that ac-
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 278 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
 134.  Id. at 277.  The civil libel law at issue had produced damages that were one thousand 
times the maximum fine under a comparable criminal statute, and the Court pointed out that 
“criminal-law safeguards,” such as an indictment, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and double 
jeopardy, would not be available to a defendant in a civil action.  Id. at 277–78. 
 135.  See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating that “criminal prosecution 
under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that them-
selves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms”). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). 
 138.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (explaining that the Court had “not 
decided . . . that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution”). 
 139.  Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 
(1982). 
 140.  Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998). 
 141.  521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that full First Amendment protection extends to speech on 
the Internet). 
 142.  Id. at 872. 
 143.  Id. at 882 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 855–56 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 
U.S. 844 (1997)). 
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companies a criminal conviction.
144
  The severity of punishment creates an 
“increased deterrent effect” that, “coupled with the ‘risk of discriminatory 
enforcement’ of vague regulations, poses greater First Amendment con-
cerns than those implicated by . . . civil regulation.”145  This language, how-
ever, seems to be in direct tension with the Court’s language from New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan
146
 equating civil sanctions of speech with crimi-
nal sanctions.
147
 
The lack of a clear rule disfavoring the criminalization of speech is a 
perversity of the United States’ deviation from proportionality analysis.  
Because speech is categorically either in or out of the First Amendment’s 
protection, the Court rarely reaches whether the sanctions themselves are 
appropriate.
148
  The only specific sanction that receives close First Amend-
ment scrutiny is the use of prior restraints.
149
  Notably, even prior restraints 
are not scrutinized in the copyright enforcement context.
150
 
A.  Judicial Abdication and the Political Economy of Intellectual 
Property 
The First Amendment thus does not distinguish between criminal and 
civil liability once a category of speech is outside of its protection.
151
  Cop-
yright policy functionally has been found to be outside the scope of First 
Amendment protection, subject only to weak rational basis review unless 
Congress tampers with the First Amendment “safety valves” of fair use or 
the idea-expression dichotomy.
152
  Because most copyright policy is effec-
tively outside of First Amendment scrutiny, the U.S. legislature has been 
                                                          
 144.  Id. at 872 (“In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the 
[Communications Decency Act of 1996] threatens violators with penalties including up to two 
years in prison for each act of violation.”). 
 145.  Id. (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)). 
 146.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 147.  Id. at 277–78. 
 148.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 149.  Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 169–70.  “Prior restraints” are defined as “prelimi-
nary injunctions, not permanent injunctions.”  Id. at 169 (emphasis omitted). 
 150.  Id. at 174–75. 
 151.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 152.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003) (finding that copyright can be rec-
onciled with the First Amendment and thus subjected only to rational basis review because it con-
tains the internal safety valves of idea-expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine; because it was 
enacted close-in-time with the First Amendment; and because copyright is the “engine of free ex-
pression”). 
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able to ratchet up speech-restricting copyright enforcement measures un-
checked by judiciary review.
153
 
Tiered review can permit judicial abdication to the legislature.
154
  This 
claim may be counterintuitive to those who see proportionality analysis as 
deferential, and tiered review as more protective.  By leaving copyright pol-
icy outside of judicial scrutiny, however, the Court defers to Congress on 
the statutory details of copyright law.
155
  This deference is a consequence of 
a First Amendment system that regularly allows for only all-or-nothing re-
view.
156
  If the Court had decided to subject copyright to more than rational 
basis review, it might have found itself regularly deciding many parameters 
of copyright policy.
157
  Instead, by functionally placing copyright outside of 
the First Amendment, the Court left all speech-related details for Congress 
to decide.
158
 
In Eldred, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Copyright Term Extension Act.  Rather than examining whether the in-
creased copyright term was disproportionately restrictive of freedom of ex-
pression, the Court explicitly deferred to Congress, explaining that “it is 
generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the 
Copyright Clause’s objectives.”159  When the Court in Golan considered 
whether Congress could take works out of the public domain and reinstate 
copyright protection, the Court reiterated that Congress may do what it 
wants with copyright policy, as long as it does not alter the “traditional con-
                                                          
 153.  See id. at 204–08 (stating that the Court is “not at liberty to second-guess congressional 
determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they 
may be”). 
 154.  Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 838. 
 155.  These statutory details of copyright law are referred to in the literature as “policy levers.”  
See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 
111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1649 (2002) (noting that “[a]ll intellectual property rights regimes . . . have 
certain policy levers in common, wielded to a greater or lesser extent”).  Bartholomew and Teh-
ranian suggest that copyright’s lack of deference to the First Amendment partially may be because 
copyright is mainly statutorily dictated.  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 71–78, 
90 (explaining that statutes can close off “avenues for addressing expressive concerns”); see also 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1578 (2010) (noting that common law is more adaptable because it uses 
standards instead of rules). 
 156.  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 72 (observing that “judges operating 
within the freedom of the common law appear better able to preserve a broad theoretical land-
scape, whereas statutory analysis restricts judicial autonomy”); Balganesh, supra note 155, at 
1578 (noting that courts have greater discretion when dealing with standards as opposed to rules). 
 157.  See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429–31 (1984) (stating that 
Congress has the “institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing 
interests that are inevitably implicated by . . . new technology”). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003). 
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tours” of copyright protection and impinge on fair use or the idea-
expression dichotomy.
160
 
The consequence of judicial deference to Congress’s choices on copy-
right policy details is that the political economy of copyright lawmaking 
remains unchecked by the judiciary in the United States.
161
  Unchecked 
copyright law-making tends to disproportionately protect rights holders at 
the expense of second-generation users and authors.
162
 
Political economists explain the stunning recent expansion of U.S. 
copyright law through “public choice” theory.163  Intellectual property crea-
tors and owners, which are often large corporations, receive high economic 
rents through copyright protection.
164
  But copiers, who are often dispersed 
individuals, receive only a competitive advantage.
165
  The costs of organiza-
tion are thus higher and the benefits of organization lower for those protect-
ing the public domain than for those desiring more copyright protection.
166
  
Without checks from the judiciary, this has resulted in an upward ratchet of 
statutory growth.
167
 
Criminal copyright law and enforcement measures, while infrequently 
discussed, are particularly problematic examples of U.S. copyright expan-
sion, from a free speech perspective.  The United States criminalizes low 
levels of copyright infringement, and employs speech-threatening enforce-
ment mechanisms, including the seizure of websites.  The United States 
has, in recent years, attempted to export its criminal standard and enforce-
ment measures worldwide.
168
  In addition, the United States has recently at-
                                                          
 160.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (“We then described the ‘traditional con-
tours’ of copyright protection, i.e., the ‘idea/expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense.”). 
 161.  Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 174–75. 
 162.  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1–5 (2004) (tracing the expansion of intellectual property protection, 
specifically focusing on the scope of copyright law). 
 163.  Id. at 10–13, 16–17. 
 164.  Id. at 14–15. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 14–15. 
 167.  But see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 808 (2008) (“The public choice accounts developed in 
IP scholarship to explain the strengthening of IP law over the last thirty years suggest that such a 
countermobilization is highly unlikely, or even impossible.  How, then, can we account for the 
new A2K mobilization and its apparent successes?”). 
 168.  See generally Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385 (2011) (arguing that ACTA was 
developed to maximize international intellectual property standards, without opportunity for fair 
negotiations amongst all interested countries); Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, An-
ti–Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (June 9, 2008), 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/development.research/SusanSellfinalversio
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tempted to apply its criminal enforcement across borders to citizens of other 
countries—where infringement is not similarly criminalized—resulting in 
several recent extradition cases.
169
 
Criminal copyright law was first enacted in the United States in 
1897.
170
  For the next century, the underlying distinction between civil and 
criminal copyright law was that criminal law punished commercial-level 
infringement, while civil law punished individual infringement for non-
commercial purposes.
171
  In 1997, the No Electronic Theft Act (“NET 
Act”)172 altered this distinction.173  Under the NET Act, an infringer no 
longer requires a commercial motive and need not infringe at a commercial-
ly significant level to be found criminally liable for copyright infringement 
in the United States.
174
 
The current criminal copyright standard is two-pronged: one prong 
targets infringement of any amount if done for private financial gain; and 
the second punishes infringement over a certain threshold amount, when 
done willfully but without a requirement of financial or commercial mo-
tive.
175
  The first prong of the statute, which requires a financial motive but 
no threshold amount of infringement, may at first seem to trace past legal 
requirements that infringement be of a commercial nature.
176
  It is, however, 
a lower hurdle.  The financial motive in the first prong need not require a 
                                                          
n.pdf (arguing that the United States exerts a strong influence on international IP framework de-
velopment in its quest for higher global IP standards). 
 169.  See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. O’Dwyer, No. 10 Mag. 2471 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/100259020/U-S-v-O-Dwyer-SDNY-1-Sealed-
Complaint.  In the Complaint, a citizen of the United Kingdom, Richard O’Dwyer, was charged 
with conspiracy to commit copyright infringement and criminal copyright infringement for own-
ing and operating TVShack.net and TVShack.cc.  See id. ¶¶ 1–4.  As a result, the United States 
successfully obtained an extradition order in British courts to bring O’Dwyer to the United States 
for trial; however, the case settled.  Richard O’Dwyer ‘Happy’ U.S. Copyright Case Is Over, BBC 
NEWS (DEC. 6, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-20636626. 
 170.  Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. 
 171.  See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry 
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735–36 (2003) (distin-
guishing between civil and criminal provisions in copyright law); Note, The Criminalization of 
Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1706–07 (1999) [hereinafter 
Note] (explaining that the 1897 Act “introduced the paradigm of differentiating criminal from civ-
il copyright violations based upon whether the infringement was pursued for purposes of commer-
cial exploitation”). 
 172.  No Electronic Theft Act (NET), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). 
 173.  The NET Act was prompted by United States v. LaMacchia, in which the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that copyright infringement lacking a com-
mercial motive could not be prosecuted under criminal law.  871 F. Supp. 535, 544–45 (D. Mass. 
1994). 
 174.  No Electronic Theft Act § 2(a). 
 175.  Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2010). 
 176.  17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2010). 
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sale; it is satisfied by the “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of 
value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.”177  Thus, in order 
to criminally infringe copyright under the statute, a user need only expect to 
receive something of value, including other copyrighted works.
178
  This def-
inition targets file sharing of any amount. 
Both prongs of current U.S. criminal copyright law sweep into realms 
traditionally occupied by civil copyright law.
179
  The first prong’s “financial 
motive” targets all intentional exchanges of infringing works, even where a 
user receives only one work from another user.
180
  The second prong’s low 
statutory threshold ($1,000 of infringement in a 180-day period, regardless 
of motive) threatens to criminalize routine infringement that has been seen 
as personal use or fair use, such as photocopying books for educational pur-
poses.
181
  Moreover, prosecutors have indicated that they are willing to 
prosecute excerpting.
182
  Fair use is a defense to criminal copyright in-
fringement, but the statutory definitions of the two criminal infringement 
offenses may restrict the scope of findings of what constitutes fair use.
183
 
The current international standard for criminal copyright resembles an 
earlier stage of U.S. law.  The international standard established in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”) requires criminalization of copyright infringement only when it 
is “willful” and done on a “commercial scale.”184   
                                                          
 177.  Id. § 101 (defining the term “financial gain”). 
 178.  Id. § 506(a)(1). 
 179.  Moohr, supra note 171, at 739. 
 180.  U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIM. DIV., 
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 54 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PROSECUTING 
MANUAL] (“For example, federal prosecutors have successfully charged ‘commercial advantage 
or private financial gain’ in cases where defendants ran a closed peer-to-peer file-trading network 
that required new users to contribute pirated material in order to join.”). 
 181.  Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of 
Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 835, 868–69 (1999). 
 182.  See PROSECUTING MANUAL, supra note 180, at 38 (discussing potential prosecution for 
reproduction of partial portions of a work). 
 183.  Fair use analysis is statutorily defined and consists of four prongs: the purpose and char-
acter of the work, the nature of the copied work, the amount and substantiality of the copying, and 
the effect on the work’s value.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010).  These low standards potentially restrict 
court findings of fair use in cases of infringement over $ 1,000, and when somebody has ex-
changed one work for another.  See, e.g., Loren, supra note 181, at 869 (pointing out that deter-
mining “criminal copyright infringement” will be difficult “when the defendant’s use is not moti-
vated by commercial advantage or private financial gain”).  The statutory definitions of criminal 
copyright infringement appear to map onto behavior that has traditionally been deemed fair use.  
Id. 
 184.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 61, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
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The United States and China recently disputed the meaning of “com-
mercial scale.”185  The United States proposed that “commercial scale” must 
encompass the activities of both those engaging in activities for a “financial 
return,” no matter how small their operations, and those who infringe at a 
“sufficient extent or magnitude,” regardless of motive.186  This proposal no-
ticeably attempted to read the international standard to reflect current U.S. 
criminal copyright law.  A World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Dispute 
Settlement Panel rejected the U.S. argument that criminal copyright covers 
all infringement except for de minimis use,
187
 and refused to provide a defi-
nition of “commercial scale.”  Instead, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 
found that the United States provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate 
what “commercial scale” meant “in the specific situation of China’s mar-
ketplace.”188  The panel also refused to reach whether “commercial scale” 
requires that states criminalize infringement over a certain amount, done 
without a for-profit motive.  Thus the panel confirmed that United States 
criminal copyright law goes beyond the international requirement that states 
criminalize commercial scale infringement.  Instead of criminalizing only 
commercial scale infringement, the U.S. definition criminalizes noncom-
mercial personal use infringement.
189
 
                                                          
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Members shall provide for crimi-
nal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale.  Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or 
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for 
crimes of a corresponding gravity.  In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the 
seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the 
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence.  Members may provide for 
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual prop-
erty rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.”). 
 185.  See generally Report of the Panel, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and En-
forcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China IP 
Panel Report] (discussing the thresholds for which the United States claims “China has not pro-
vided for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in cases of wilful trademark counterfeit-
ing or copyright piracy on a commercial scale”); see also Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal Copyright Enforcement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 67, 71–72 (2012) (noting the rapid pace at which “[c]riminal law has been embed-
ding itself into intellectual property law,” as well as “difficulty and opposition” resulting from the 
“unique characteristics of intellectual properties”); Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 
89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1056 (2011) (citing TRIPS Agreement art. 61). 
 186.  China IP Panel Report, supra note 185, at § 7.480. 
 187.  Id. at § 7.551–7.553. 
 188.  Id. at § 7.614. 
 189.  See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringe-
ment, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 469, 516 (2011) (referring to the current criminalization standard in 
copyright law as reaching “non-commercial copyright infringement”); Moohr, supra note 11, at 
800 (referring to the NET Act as targeting personal use infringement). 
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Numerous scholars have criticized the expansion of U.S. criminal cop-
yright law, exploring its lack of moral underpinnings.
190
  They have argued 
that the costs are too high and benefits too uncertain.
191
  They have criti-
cized the expansion as a psychologically ineffective enforcement tactic.
192
  
They have even criticized the criminal copyright standard under the Copy-
right Clause, concluding that overly broad copyright criminalization un-
dermines the constitutional purpose of copyright law.
193
 
B.  Speech Problems with Criminal Copyright 
Although numerous scholars have noted that criminal copyright raises 
speech problems, these problems have not been discussed at length.
194
  Per-
haps the lack of scholarly analysis has been due to under enforcement of the 
NET Act.
195
  In 2008, however, Congress enacted the Priority Resources 
and Organization for Intellectual Property Act (“PRO-IP Act”) to increase 
                                                          
 190.  STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 253–57 (2012) (concluding copyright offenders are not “sufficiently culpable 
to justify criminalization”); Bitton, supra note 185, at 72; Moohr, supra note 171, at 735;  see also 
Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2004) (discussing white-collar crimes and the difficulties of identifying 
both harms and victims). 
 191.  Moohr, supra note 11, at 807–08. 
 192.  See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Per-
spective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 224–25 (1997). 
 193.  See Note, supra note 171, at 1718 (“The mere threat of criminal penalties could chill the 
very activities that the Copyright Clause is intended to promote.”); see generally Diane L. Kilpat-
rick-Lee, Criminal Copyright Law: Preventing a Clear Danger to the U.S. Economy or Clearly 
Preventing the Original Purpose of Copyright Law?, 14 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 87, 118 
(2005) (concluding that the evolution of copyright law and the punishments go beyond its original 
purpose and what is necessary to deter infringement). 
 194.  See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 305, 306 (2002) (explaining that criminal copyright is perceived by the general public as re-
stricting free speech and other paramount rights); Bitton, supra note 185, at 83 (“Criminalizing 
copyright law also implicates First Amendment rights.”); Loren, supra note 181, at 861 (noting 
that copyright policy implicates “special concerns” that include “the inherent tension with the val-
ues embodied in the First Amendment that are present when people are given a monopoly over 
expressive works”); Manta, supra note 189, at 516 (explaining that criminal copyright might pose 
a particularly difficult problem because of the “possible chilling effect on expressive activities”); 
Moohr, supra note 11, at 789 n.14 (noting that “the First Amendment also plays a role in copy-
right doctrine, preventing the rights granted to authors from restricting the public’s right to free 
speech”); Note, supra note 171, at 1718 (“The mere threat of criminal penalties could chill the 
very activities that the Copyright Clause is intended to promote.”). 
 195.  See Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Cop-
yright Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 377 (2003) (noting that no convictions were made during 
the first eighteen months after the NET Act’s enactment). 
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criminal enforcement, and the speech problems have since become more 
apparent, prompting further academic discussion.
196
 
Since the PRO-IP Act, criminal copyright enforcement efforts both in-
side and outside of the United States have increased.  It can be difficult to 
ascertain precise numbers, because the government combines its assessment 
of copyright enforcement with other kinds of intellectual property (“IP”) en-
forcement in its data collection. 
The U.S. government, however, has highlighted its general increase in 
IP enforcement since the PRO-IP Act.
197
  Since 2009, United States Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and Homeland Security Investi-
gations (“HIS”) of IP-related cases are up 71%, arrests are up 159%, and 
convictions are up 103%.
198
  The FBI has increased IP-related arrests by 
68% since 2010.
199
  In each year since 2009, Assistant United States Attor-
neys have charged approximately 170 criminal IP cases, representing a 14% 
increase in the number of defendants charged per year prior to 2009.
200
  Of 
the 202 IP defendants sentenced in 2012, over half received prison terms, 
with over 40 defendants receiving sentences of longer than one year in pris-
on.
201
  International cooperation between national law enforcement agencies 
has also increased, as U.S. agencies cooperate with agencies in Canada, 
Mexico, and international bodies, such as INTERPOL.
202
  The United States 
has highlighted several extradition efforts related to copyright crimes.
203
 
In addition to building enforcement infrastructure, the PRO-IP Act 
created new civil and criminal forfeiture provisions.
204
  The United States 
                                                          
 196.  PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong § 4 (2011); Grace Pyun, The 2008 PRO-
IP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in Criminal Intellectual Property Law and Its 
Effect on Prosecutorial Boundaries, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 355, 377–78 
(2009).  See generally Christopher J. Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarcera-
tion: An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law 1–4 (University of Chicago 
Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 649, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2297488 (discussing the scope and enforcement of IP laws and their ex-
pansion in the use of criminal sanctions to deter IP violations).  
 197.  See, e.g., U.S. INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 1 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Joint Strategic 
Plan]. 
 198.  Id.  
 199.  Id. at 21. 
 200.  Id. at 21, 44.  See also Ryan Rufo, Below the Surface of the ACTA: The Dangers That 
Justify New Criminal Sanctions Against Intellectual Property Infringement, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 511, 
530 (2011) (describing a report estimating that “17.53% of total Internet traffic in the United 
States infringed intellectual property rights”). 
 201.  2013 Joint Strategic Plan, supra note 197, at 44. 
 202.  Id. at 25. 
 203.  Id. at 26, 30. 
 204.  Pyun, supra note 196, at 356. 
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has been using these provisions, founded on its underlying standard for 
criminal copyright law, to seize and forfeit websites ex parte, and without 
subsequently going to trial.
205
  Operation in Our Sites, a coordinated effort 
between multiple U.S. law enforcement agencies, resulted in the govern-
ment seizure of more than 1,700 website domain names since 2010 and the 
seizure of substantial monetary assets.
206
  Project Fake Sweep, nominally a 
trademark enforcement operation, has also seized over 300 websites en-
gaged in distributing allegedly pirated copyrighted works.
207
 
There are at least five distinct speech problems with enforcing a stand-
ard for criminal copyright infringement that extends broadly enough to in-
clude noncommercial personal use.  The first is a First Amendment due 
process problem: there is no protection from prior restraints in copyright 
law and, therefore, the government can use and has used criminal copyright 
procedures to take speech down ex parte and before trial.
208
  The second is a 
collateral censorship problem: when governments go after the intermediar-
ies, as the United States has through criminal copyright enforcement, inter-
mediaries often become overcautious and censor user speech.
209
  Third, 
overcriminalization pushes intermediaries into private ordering out of fear 
of enforcement, which promotes privatized censorship and reduces trans-
parency.
210
  Fourth, criminalizing low-level infringement impinges on an 
Internet user’s right to receive information.211  And fifth, a low criminal 
standard permits arbitrary enforcement, which can be used to punish other 
                                                          
 205.  Mike Masnick, Website Censored by Feds Takes Up Lamar Smith’s Challenge: Here’s 
Your ‘Hypothetical,’ TECHDIRT (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120110/11395317367/website-censored-feds-takes-up-lamar-
smiths-challenge-heres-your-hypothetical.shtml.  Most famously, the United States charged Kim 
Dotcom and his associates with both direct criminal copyright infringement and accomplice liabil-
ity, and forfeited their domain names.  See Drew Olanoff, Here’s the Full 72 Page Megaupload 
DOJ Indictment, THENEXTWEB (Jan. 20, 2012, 12:12 AM), 
http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/01/20/heres-the-full-72-page-megaupload-doj-indictment/.  
The U.K. citizen Richard O’Dwyer was also charged with both conspiracy to commit copyright 
infringement, and criminal copyright infringement, for owning and operating TVShack.net and 
TVShack.cc.  Both domain names were seized.  See supra note 169. 
 206.  2013 Joint Strategic Plan, supra note 197, at 20. 
 207.  Id. at 65. 
 208.  Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 158–65; Rubenfeld, supra note 90, at 3.  Although it 
has not yet had an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of civil in rem forfeiture, the Court 
has been careful to distinguish between criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings.  See Alexander 
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1993) (explaining that the criminal forfeiture provision at 
issue was after trial, and therefore not a prior restraint); Id. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (distinguishing that this case concerned criminal forfeiture, not civil forfei-
ture). 
 209.  See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 210.  Derek Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 867–68 (2012). 
 211.  See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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kinds of speech the government does not like, and can cause chilling ef-
fects.
212
 
The combination of a low underlying criminal copyright standard and 
a lack of First Amendment scrutiny allows the government to employ crim-
inal procedures that, when applied to speech, resemble prior restraints.
213
  In 
the name of criminal copyright enforcement, the United States has used pre-
indictment seizures to seize the domain names of websites prior to trial.
214
  
The low standard of criminal infringement eases the probable cause re-
quirement, providing low hurdles for the government’s ability to obtain a 
warrant to seize an entire website domain.
215
   
Seizing an entire site implicates the speech rights of more than the ac-
cused; it also censors all other users who speak through the website, regard-
less of whether they are copyright infringers.
216
  The tool of civil asset for-
feiture, created by the PRO-IP Act of 2008, does not even require probable 
cause.
217
  Civil asset forfeiture is problematic, but it may be less significant 
than critics have deemed in this area because of how easy it is to show 
probable cause of low-level criminal infringement and thus obtain a pre-
indictment seizure warrant. 
The second speech problem raised by the low criminal copyright 
standard is collateral censorship.
218
  How liable websites are for criminal 
copyright infringement that occurs through them is unclear.  Even if prior 
restraint problems are solved, an overly broad criminal standard still creates 
a specter of criminal liability for an intermediary for de minimis behavior or 
even accidental behavior.  The specter of criminal liability encourages col-
                                                          
 212.  See infra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 213.  Timothy B. Lee, How the Criminalization of Copyright Threatens Innovation and the 
Rule of Law, in COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE TO EXCESS 55, 55–74 (Jerry Brito 
ed., 2012). 
 214.  See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Breaking News: Feds Falsely Censor Popular Blog for over a 
Year, Deny All Due Process, Hide All Details . . ., TECHDIRT (Dec. 8, 2011, 8:29 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111208/08225217010/breaking-news-feds-falsely-censor-
popular-blog-over-year-deny-all-due-process-hide-all-details.shtml (discussing a pre-indictment 
seizure of a website domain for over a year before trial). 
 215.  See Mike Masnick, Feds Tie Themselves in Legal Knots Arguing for Domain Forfeiture 
in Rojadirecta Case, TECHDIRT (May 16, 2012, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120516/05031118941/feds-tie-themselves-legal-knots-
arguing-domain-forfeiture-rojadirecta-case.shtml (arguing that the government “could easily seize 
and forfeit any search engine domain or any website that allows public comments, merely by as-
serting that a link in a search result or a link in a comment led to infringing material”). 
 216.  Christina Mulligan, Technological Intermediaries and Freedom of the Press, 66 SMU L. 
REV. 101, 120–21 (2013). 
 217.  Pyun, supra note 196, at 387. 
 218.  See Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the 
“Speaker” with the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 116 (1995); see also J.M. Balkin, 
Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2298 (1999). 
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lateral censorship by the intermediary against the user.
219
  Intermediaries are 
not invested in content in the same way users are, so a fear of criminal lia-
bility can cause intermediaries to take down user material out of an excess 
of caution.  Criminal copyright liability is a real threat for online intermedi-
aries: the U.S. government has charged online intermediaries with both di-
rect criminal infringement and aiding and abetting criminal infringement.
220
 
The third speech problem is related: threatening to charge online in-
termediaries with criminal infringement, whether direct or secondary, can 
push them into more opaque private ordering regimes with less due process 
for Internet users.  This scenario arises out of the same natural caution that 
causes collateral censorship.  If an online intermediary fears criminal en-
forcement, one thing it can do to protect itself is to make a bargain with 
content owners to show good intent.  The PRO-IP Act established a system 
wherein content owners consult with the Department of Justice about bad 
actors.
221
  In the United States, content owners and Internet Service Provid-
ers (“ISPs”) have entered into a bargain, with encouragement from the U.S. 
IP Enforcement Coordinator: the copyright alert system.  The copyright 
alert system is a private agreement, in which ISPs promise to slow down In-
ternet speeds if copyright infringement is found.
222
  Privately ordered regu-
lation such as this is problematic because citizens have trouble identifying 
and protesting it, and thereby engaging in the process of governance. 
The fourth speech problem raised by the overcriminalization of copy-
right infringement is that it impinges on the Internet user’s right to receive 
information, recognized in both international and U.S. law.  The Supreme 
Court noted that “the Constitution protects the right to receive information 
                                                          
 219.  United States courts have also recognized the problem of collateral censorship, although 
without calling it by that name.  The 1959 case of Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v. 
WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959), beautifully outlines the problem.  In the context of the FCC’s must-
carry rules, a local radio station could not take down a candidate’s speech just because they judged 
it to be libelous.  That station, however, also could not be held liable for libel.  The court stated:  
Quite possibly, if a station were held responsible for the broadcast of libelous material, 
all remarks even faintly objectionable would be excluded out of an excess of caution.  
Moreover, if any censorship were permissible, a station so inclined could intentionally 
inhibit a candidate’s legitimate presentation under the guise of lawful censorship of li-
belous matter. 
Id. at 530. 
 220.  See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 221.  See Priority Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq. (2012)), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ403/pdf/PLAW-110publ403.pdf. 
 222.  See Lisa Richwine, Internet Providers to Act Against Online Pirates, REUTERS, July 7, 
2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-internet-piracy-idUSTRE7667FL20110707 
(reporting that certain U.S. ISPs will post warning messages and throttle internet speeds should 
they discover their customers illegally downloading copyrighted films). 
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and ideas.”223  This right “is fundamental to our free society.”224  The right 
to receive information is linked to a right to personal intellectual breathing 
space,
225
 and “the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of 
[one’s] library.”226  Copyright enforcement involves examining the contents 
of one’s library.227  Criminalizing a de minimis level of infringement, with a 
low showing of intent, allows the state—in addition to private actors—to 
partake in the examination of any content a user might have.
228
  Such crimi-
nal copyright infringement often appears in proposed U.S. laws as a justifi-
cation for state surveillance or network management.
229
  The U.S. network 
neutrality provisions contain carve-outs for monitoring and managing ille-
gal content, explicitly including copyright infringing material.
230
 
Finally, overcriminalization gives rise to the problem of arbitrary en-
forcement.  Arbitrary enforcement chills speech; this reasoning is often 
used to justify the First Amendment’s overbreadth and vagueness doctrines.  
A vague statute “delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”231  Broad criminaliza-
tion has the same practical consequences: if everybody is a criminal, the 
state can choose whom to prosecute at will.  This discretion allows states to 
prosecute citizens for copyright infringement as punishment for other be-
havior or speech that they cannot otherwise prosecute. 
In Russia, for example, the government has arrested a series of noted 
dissidents not for political speech but ostensibly for copyright infringe-
                                                          
 223.  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Rubenfeld, supra note 90, at 24–25, 28. 
 226.  Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
 227.  See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 166 (observing that copyright law “seriously 
restricts speakers’ ability to express themselves the way they want” and therefore should be sub-
ject to First Amendment scrutiny). 
 228.  See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copy-
right Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981 (1996) (discussing “digital moni-
toring of individual reading habits for purposes of so-called ‘copyright management’ in cyber-
space”); see also Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1417, 1452 (2009) (discussing the proper balance between ISP surveillance and user privacy). 
 229.  Emil Protalinski, After Denouncing SOPA and PIPA, How Can Facebook Support 
CISPA?, ZDNET (Apr. 12, 2010, 8:07 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/after-
denouncing-sopa-and-pipa-how-can-facebook-support-cispa/11700 (“CISPA also includes por-
tions about protecting intellectual property . . .  If an IP thief is considered a threat to cyber securi-
ty, then his website, or where he posted the content, could technically be blocked by CISPA.”). 
 230.  Open Internet, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/openinternet (last visited Jan. 17, 2014) 
(“[N]othing in the rules prohibits reasonable efforts by a broadband provider to address copyright 
infringement or other unlawful activity.”). 
 231.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (noting that an overly inclu-
sive criminal standard raises the same concerns discussed in the vagueness doctrine).  
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ment.
232
  In the 1990s, the United States Trade Representative made a deci-
sion not to ask for IP enforcement in China because it feared that IP en-
forcement would be used as a guise for political repression.
233
  In the United 
States, the prosecution of Aaron Swartz under the overly broad Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) was viewed by many as retribution for his 
involvement in the Stop Online Privacy Act (“SOPA”) protests.234  Over-
criminalization of speech allows a government to go after any of its citizens 
to prevent behavior that cannot itself be criminalized, creating the same 
problem recognized by the Court when a state carved out particular subcat-
egories for enforcement within an otherwise unprotected category of 
speech.
235
  Beyond permitting bad government behavior, the “risk of dis-
criminatory enforcement” can create chilling effects.236 
Many copyright scholars implicitly assume copyright “piracy” is one-
to-one infringement done in lieu of a purchase, and consequently refuse to 
include piracy within the scope of free speech protections.
237
  But the inter-
national legal standard defines “piracy” simply as copyright infringe-
ment.
238
  Unchecked criminal copyright enforcement presents many of the 
same speech problems as its civil counterpart. 
The secondary effects of overcriminalization of copyright infringement 
are an important discussion; however, there are also speech-related prob-
lems with the underlying standard itself.  Insofar as there is agreement that 
copyright overlaps with speech, principles generally used in other speech 
areas should be applied.  A speaker’s intent is often central to the state’s 
ability to punish that speech.
239
  Usually, the state cannot assume the intent 
                                                          
 232.  Mike Masnick, Russian Officials Abusing Copyright Law—with Microsoft’s Help—to 
Intimidate Gov’t Critics, TECHDIRT (Sept. 13, 2010, 8:47 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100912/12440610969.shtml. 
 233.  Yu, supra note 185, at 1085. 
 234.  Jacob Sloan, Did the Government Target Aaron Swartz over His Role in Defeating 
SOPA?, DISINFORMATION (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.disinfo.com/2013/01/did-the-government-
target-aaron-swartz-over-his-role-in-defeating-sopa. 
 235.  R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 37, 384 (1992). 
 236.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997). 
 237.  See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 211–12 (explaining that piracy is an “[e]asy” 
case, and First Amendment due process should not apply where a defendant has made “identical 
or nearly identical copies of the plaintiff’s works, and there is no claim of fair use but only some 
other copyright defense”); Tushnet, supra note 90, at 567 (“I have no free speech right to down-
load entire works for which I could readily pay.”). 
 238.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 184, at 342 (“‘[P]irated copyright goods’ shall mean 
any goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder . . . which are made di-
rectly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have constituted an in-
fringement of a copyright or a related right.”). 
 239.  See Anjali Dalal, Protecting Hyperlinks and Preserving First Amendment Values on the 
Internet, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1017, 1069 (2011) (advocating that “applying the doctrine devel-
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of a speaker, but instead, must demonstrate that intent.  Free speech protec-
tion often requires the state to establish that a speaker has particularly mali-
cious intent, or intends that his or her speech will produce harmful conse-
quences.
240
 
One prong of the U.S. criminal copyright standard requires only that 
the infringer intend to break the law, with no motivation of financial gain.
241
  
This is a low level of intent that might be met, for example, by showing that 
the original copyrighted work had an FBI warning explaining that copyright 
infringement is a criminal offense.  That low level of intent is not reconcil-
able with historical concerns about intent in free speech jurisprudence.
242
  
To be speech protective in the area of criminal copyright, which is so often 
analogized to theft, the standard might require that the infringer intends to 
engage in theft rather than speech. 
Free speech principles also suggest that for speech to be regulated, it 
must have particularly harmful consequences.
243
  The “substantive evil must 
be extremely serious” for free speech protection not to apply.244  Courts 
should be wary of impinging upon “speech that . . . creates no victims.”245 
The U.S. criminal copyright standard targets copyright infringement 
done with the expectation of the receipt of anything of value, regardless of 
the scale of infringement and the level of harm to the rights holder.
246
  The 
second prong of the U.S. standard targets infringement done with no mali-
cious motivation, but at a certain scale: $1,000 of aggregate infringement in 
180 days.  That is not “serious” harm, especially when the $1,000 value es-
timate is made with an assumption that copyright infringing goods should 
be valued at full market value.
247
  This low standard is justified by the ag-
                                                          
oped in Sullivan, courts should demand an intent-based standard that requires plaintiffs to show 
that defendants possessed the requisite mens rea to facilitate illegal behavior”). 
 240.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (rejecting the state’s use of cross burning 
as prima facie evidence for intent to intimidate, because the provision “blurs the line between 
these two meanings of a burning cross”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (the 
speech must be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action”); New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (requiring a showing of actual malice on the part of the 
reporter for liability to attach to statements made). 
 241.  No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997); 17 U.S.C. § 
506(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 242.  See supra notes 174–178 and accompanying text. 
 243.  See Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978). 
 244.  See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (establishing a “working principle 
that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high 
before utterances can be punished”). 
 245.  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002). 
 246.   No Electronic Theft (NET) Act § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997); 17 
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 247.  Goldman, supra note 195, at 426–27. 
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gregate harm to the industry.  In the speech context, however, individuals 
should not be punished for the aggregate harm done to an industry; they 
should be punished only for the harm they themselves create. 
IV.  THE EXPORTATION OF THE U.S. CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT STANDARD 
United States criminal copyright law is speech-restrictive, and the 
United States is exporting it.  Using the weight of its cultural and economic 
power, the United States is in the process of foisting its version of criminal 
copyright law on the rest of the world.
248
  Between 1997 and the present, 
the United States has entered into a number of bilateral and plurilateral free 
trade agreements that provide a criminal standard more similar to the NET 
Act than to the current international standard established in TRIPS.
249
 
United States free trade agreements, like U.S. law, deviate from the in-
ternational requirement that countries criminalize copyright infringement 
done on a “commercial scale.”  Instead, similar to U.S. law, the free trade 
agreements split criminal copyright into two parts.  The first offense crimi-
nalizes infringement done for “commercial advantage or private financial 
gain,” with private financial gain often defined as the “receipt of anything 
of value.”250  The second offense criminalizes “significant infringement” 
with no motivation of financial gain.
251
 
Appendix I shows the extent to which the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative has achieved its agenda.  The United States currently 
has free trade agreements with twenty countries.
252
  Most of these agree-
ments contain detailed intellectual property provisions, including provisions 
on criminal copyright law.
253
  The three free trade agreements and two re-
gional agreements examined as examples in the appendix do show some 
variation, depending on the pushback from the negotiating countries.
254
  Co-
lumbia represents the most stringent criminal standard, followed by Aus-
                                                          
 248.  Sell, supra note 168, at 10–12. 
 249.  Id. at 8. 
 250.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 251.  Id. § 506(a)(1)(B).  This second definition mimics but does not precisely export its U.S. 
equivalent, which penalizes willful reproduction or distribution of over $1,000 in 180 days.  Id.  
Using the term “significant infringement” instead of this statutory threshold could give other sig-
natory states more autonomy, or could result in a lower threshold for criminal infringement with 
no for-profit motive than even the NET Act standard. 
 252.  Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
 253.  Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
 254.  See infra Appendix. 
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tralia, which resisted the insertion of “private” before “financial gain.”255  
Chile achieved several important concessions in its negotiations, including 
a footnote explicitly leaving out de minimis infringement, no matter the mo-
tive.
256
  The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) contains a particularly stringent standard, 
criminalizing “willful infringements that have no direct or indirect motiva-
tion of financial gain, provided that there is more than a de minimis finan-
cial harm.”257 
While international law currently does not explicitly criminalize aiding 
and abetting copyright infringement, the United States recently put forward 
provisions in the ACTA criminalizing aiding and abetting copyright in-
fringement by companies.
258
  This addition targets website owners, as evi-
denced by recent prosecutions of website owners by U.S. authorities.  It can 
be expected to appear in future free trade agreements.
259
  The United States 
also exports prior-restraint-like seizure procedures.
260
  Free trade agree-
ments and the ACTA both contemplate the pre-trial seizure and forfeiture of 
materials, likely including websites, used during infringement.
261
 
The exportation of U.S. criminal copyright law not only exports both a 
substantive criminal standard and enforcement mechanisms, it also transfers 
the U.S. understanding of the nexus between copyright and free expression: 
that copyright law receives no speech scrutiny.  This approach is increasing-
ly out of line with the public intuition about copyright and free speech. 
The U.S. population does not appear to believe that intellectual proper-
ty crimes are morally wrong.
262
  By recent industry estimates in 2011, over 
                                                          
 255.  See infra Appendix. 
 256.  See infra Appendix. 
 257.  See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Ch. 15, 
art. 26(a), Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter CAFTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file934_3935.pdf 
(last visited Jan 29, 2014). 
 258.  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 23(4) [hereinafter ACTA], available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 
2014). 
 259.  See supra Part I. 
 260.  See infra Part V. 
 261.  See, e.g., U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, ch. 17, art. 26(b), May 18, 2004, 
431.6.M.1248 [hereinafter Australia FTA], available at tp://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, ch. 17, art. 22(c), 
June 6, 2003, 421.6.M.1026 [hereinafter Chile FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text; ACTA supra note 258, at arts. 25(1), 25(3). 
 262.  Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on 
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 
238 (2002); Hardy, supra note 194, at 306–08; Pyun, supra note 196, at 390–91; see also Tom R. 
Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. 
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17% of U.S. Internet traffic is IP-infringing.
263
  One-third of the U.S. popu-
lation under 30 finds sharing music acceptable; one-quarter of Internet users 
aged 30-49 engage in file sharing; and 12% of users over 50 file share.
264
 
The nature of intellectual property and the ways in which it differs 
from real property also contribute to the moral ambiguity of IP infringe-
ment.
265
  While Congress may repeatedly use the analogy of real property 
theft,
266
 the general public is ambivalent about equating copyright to proper-
ty.
267
  People have instincts about property, obtained from decades of per-
sonal experience with ownership rights in tangible objects and face-to-face 
transactions.
268
  Intellectual property infringement, however, often involves 
intangible objects and an aggregate harm rather than face-to-face transac-
tions and individualized harm, and is therefore not intuitively perceived as 
morally equivalent to real property theft.
269
  Appreciating the aggregate ef-
fect of one’s actions does not come naturally, so infringers rarely feel guilty 
for these actions.
270
 
People appear to have a strong speech intuition that is invoked by ex-
cessive copyright enforcement.  Recent protest movements in the United 
States and abroad successfully galvanized millions by describing copyright 
enforcement as “censorship.” 
Two recent mass protest movements show how the public’s speech in-
tuition has been harnessed to criticize copyright enforcement.  The SOPA 
was the latest in a series of copyright enforcement bills that proposed block-
ing domain name service (“DNS”) to websites alleged to be bad actors.271  
DNS-blocking functionally shuts down a website, although users in the 
know can easily route around the blockage.
272
  To obtain a court order to 
block U.S.-directed sites, the United States Attorney General would allege 
                                                          
INT’L L. & POL. 219, 225 (1997) (discussing the moral judgments of people in the United States 
and how such judgments shape law-related behavior). 
 263.  Rufo, supra note 200, at 530. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Hardy, supra note 194, at 326; Moohr, supra note 171, at 766. 
 266.  See Manta, supra note 189, at 473 (noting that policymakers rely on the property analogy 
and theft analogy). 
 267.  Hardy, supra note 194, at 326. 
 268.  Id. at 332. 
 269.  Id. at 332, 338. 
 270.  Id. at 338. 
 271.  See Yochai Benkler, Seven Lessons from SOPA/PIPA/Megaupload and Four Proposals 
on Where We Go from Here, TECHPRESIDENT (Jan. 25 2012), 
http://techpresident.com/news/21680/seven-lessons-sopapipamegauplaod-and-four-proposals-
where-we-go-here; see also David G. Robinson, Following the Money: A Better Way Forward on 
the PROTECT IP Act, 24 (Sept. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930013. 
 272.  Id. at 2. 
 2014] COPYRIGHT CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 623 
 
criminal copyright infringement or facilitation of criminal copyright in-
fringement.
273
 
From November 16, 2011, the first day of House hearings on the 
SOPA, to January 18, 2012, a growing coalition of political insiders and 
popular outsiders used the Internet and the cause of preventing censorship 
to rally U.S. citizens against the SOPA legislation.
274
  Activists, not law-
yers, proposed the censorship framework.
275
  The censorship framing re-
flected a popular intuition that enforcement encroached on speech rights, 
not a legal argument that SOPA violated the First Amendment.
276
  The coa-
lition was able to point to existing examples of web censorship done in the 
name of copyright enforcement, such as the yearlong takedown of the music 
blog Dajaz1.com.
277
 
The first popular protest against SOPA occurred in November 2011, 
on the eve of the first House hearings.  Advocates from Fight for the Future 
proposed calling the day “American Censorship Day” and encouraged sites 
to adopt “stop censorship” banners.278  Four million people visited the 
AmericanCensorship.org site on the day of the hearing, and multiple com-
panies joined in the protest.
279
 
As of January 18, 2012, however, eighty members of Congress still 
supported SOPA and only thirty-one opposed it.
280
  That same day, more 
than 15,000 websites went dark in a coalition-organized protest of SOPA; 
                                                          
 273.  James Temple, Stop Online Piracy Act Would Stop Online Innovation, SFGATE (Nov. 2, 
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Stop-Online-Piracy-Act-would-stop-
online-2324440.php. 
 274.  See Susan K. Sell, Revenge of the “Nerds”: Collective Action Against Intellectual Prop-
erty Maximalism in the Global Information Age, 15 INT’L STUD. REV. 67, 68–69, 72  (2013) 
(providing a list of SOPA’s opponents).  See generally EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR THE 
FUTURE: HOW PEOPLE DEFEATED HOLLYWOOD AND SAVED THE INTERNET—FOR NOW 2–4 
(2013) (describing how people organized the largest Internet protest in history, plus the largest 
single-day demonstration on the streets of twenty-seven countries of the European Union). 
 275.  See Cindy Cohn, Address at the Yale Law School Information Society Project (Feb. 14, 
2013), available at http://ylsqtss.law.yale.edu:8080/qtmedia/isp/ISPCohen021413_s.mov (ex-
plaining that Fight for the Future advocates, not attorneys, proposed labeling SOPA “censorship”). 
 276.  Id.  A First Amendment argument was later suggested by academics.  See Laurence H. 
Tribe, The “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates the First Amendment 1–4 (Dec. 6, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/75153093/Tribe-Legis-Memo-
on-SOPA-12-6-11-1 (listing several provisions of SOPA that violate the First Amendment). 
 277.  Masnick, supra note 205. 
 278.  Parker Higgins, American Censorship Day Is This Wednesday—And You Can Join In!, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Nov. 10, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/american-censorship-day-wednesday-and-you-can-join. 
 279.  Sell, supra note 274, at 76. 
 280.  Josh Constine, SOPA Protests Sway Congress: 31 Opponents Yesterday, 122 Now, 
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 19, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/19/sopa-opponents-supporters. 
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Google and Craigslist featured censorship bars on their homepages.
281
  Over 
five million signatures supported Google’s online petition against SOPA.282  
By Friday of that week, Congress shelved SOPA and its Senate counterpart, 
the Protect IP Act (“PIPA”).283 
The defeat of SOPA roused a transnational coalition that had already 
been fighting against another significant copyright enforcement effort, the 
ACTA.
284
  Negotiated outside of existing international institutions as a large 
trade agreement, ACTA attempted to ratchet up international copyright, 
trademark, and patent standards and enforcement measures, including bor-
der measures and criminal enforcement.
285
  Eight participating countries, 
including the United States, signed ACTA in October 2011.
286
  The Europe-
an Union and its member states had not yet signed ACTA when SOPA 
failed in the United States.
287
 
On January 26, 2012, twenty-one member states of the EU, including 
the UK, signed ACTA.
288
  In the three days leading up to signature, protests 
similar to the anti-SOPA protests broke out across Europe.  In Poland, 
crowds of thousands of young people gathered, many holding up banners 
protesting censorship.
289
  Some put tape over their mouths to signify their 
fears.
290
  As more of Europe considered adopting ACTA, protests mount-
ed.
291
  In Croatia, demonstrators carried banners reading, “Stop internet 
censorship.”292  In Warsaw, banners read “Down with censorship” and 
                                                          
 281.  Sell, supra note 274, at 77. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  Jonathan Weisman, Antipiracy Bills Delayed After an Online Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 21, 2012, at B6. 
 284.  Adam Clark Estes, SOPA Stopped for Now, Anti-Censorship Activists Turn to ACTA, 
THE WIRE (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.thewire.com/technology/2012/01/sopa-
stopped-now-anti-censorship-activists-turn-acta/47892/. 
 285.  Kaminski, supra note 168, at 401–10. 
 286.  David Kravets, US Signs ACTA, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 4, 2011, 5:00 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/10/us-signs-international-anti-piracy-accord. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Charles Arthur, ACTA Protests Break Out as EU States Sign Up to Treaty, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/27/acta-
protests-eu-states-sign-treaty. 
 289.  Thousands March in Poland over ACTA Internet Treaty, BBC NEWS EUROPE (Jan. 26, 
2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16735219. 
 290.  Vanessa Gera, ACTA Protests in Poland: Groups Fear Copyright Treaty Will Lead to 
Censorship, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2012, 2:51 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/acta-protests-poland_n_1229110.html. 
 291.  Charles Arthur, ACTA Criticised After Thousands Protest in Europe, THE GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 13, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/feb/13/acta-protests-
europe. 
 292.  Id. 
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“Free internet.”293  Protests also occurred in Paris, Budapest, and Prague.294  
One article hypothesized that Eastern European countries and Germany 
were particularly sensitive about the intertwined history of state enforce-
ment and surveillance.
295
 
A coalition of insiders and outsiders harnessed the power of the Inter-
net under the framework of “censorship” to stop the ACTA treaty in Eu-
rope.
296
  In 2012, the European Parliament rejected the ACTA, and it died 
in Europe when the European Court of Justice refused to hear claims.
297
 
These examples show that people around the world mobilized to pro-
test copyright enforcement under the banner of free speech.  The First 
Amendment approach to copyright has diverged not only from the interna-
tional approach, but also from these popular intuitions about copyright and 
speech.  Congress formed the current U.S. criminal copyright law with no 
judicial scrutiny and at odds with what the public sees as speech rights.  The 
United States is using its strengths to export that law, and the international 
public is beginning to visibly push back. 
V.  PATHOLOGIES OF THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH 
The story of criminal copyright and the First Amendment provides an 
important point of comparison between the categorical approach to consti-
tutional analysis and proportionality review.  Categorical analysis can, in 
borderline cases, foster a divide between the popular understanding of 
rights and judicial protection.  When there is an imbalance between the leg-
islature and the judiciary, the legislature may exploit that imbalance until 
the popular understanding of speech rights is broader than the judicial un-
derstanding.
298
  Categorical analysis can thus give rise to a gap between 
popular perception and judicial doctrine on fundamental rights. 
The categorical approach to the First Amendment fails to permit courts 
to step in when the state criminalizes speech that should be subject to lesser 
sanctions.  The U.S. doctrinal lack of sensitivity to the scope of penalties, 
                                                          
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  See id. (observing that “the accord has sparked concerns, especially in Eastern European 
countries as well as in Germany which is sensitive about its history with the Gestapo and Stasi 
secret police, over online censorship and increased surveillance”). 
 296.  See Mike Palmedo, Mapping of Web Space Around the ACTA Debate, INFOJUSTICE.ORG 
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://infojustice.org/archives/28226. 
 297.  Margot Kaminski, Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries 5–6 (Pro-
gram on Info. Justice and Intellectual Prop., Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. Law, Research Paper No. 
2012-05, 2012), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1029&context=research. 
 298.  See supra Part I.A. 
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and whether they are administered by the state or a private actor, is a conse-
quence of categorical reasoning.
299
 
When categorical reasoning is combined with a complicated statutory 
regime, judges are particularly likely to abdicate analysis and defer to the 
legislature.  Statutory regimes leave less room for judicial discretion in bal-
ancing rights, because such discretion is constrained by potential conflict 
with the legislature.
300
  Copyright law is the perfect storm, where a detailed 
statutory regime meets categorical reasoning. 
I do not claim that proportionality analysis is always more speech-
protective.  For non-borderline cases, categorical analysis protects more 
speech because it protects speech until that speech falls into a clearly delin-
eated unprotected category.
301
  Proportionality analysis, by contrast, re-
quires that courts balance speech against other rights or government pur-
poses—it does not dictate that speech always trumps other rights.302  Thus, 
when foreign courts weigh copyright against speech, the strength of the Eu-
ropean justifications for copyright can in fact trump speech concerns, espe-
cially where a court views the speech claim as weaker because the speech at 
hand is commercial.
303
  But proportionality analysis is more speech-
protective of unprotected speech, in its ability to permit judicial review and 
prevent judicial abdication over categorically unprotected speech.
304
 
I also do not claim that the United States is alone in having an over-
eager legislature on copyright matters.  Other countries have criminal copy-
right standards that overcriminalize.
305
  In those countries subject to propor-
tionality analysis, however, courts provide a mechanism for challenging the 
enforcement of those laws and a framework for evaluating whether they are 
disproportionate as speech regulation. 
The recent example of the ECHR’s consideration of the Pirate Bay ap-
plication, described by the court as one of the world’s largest file sharing 
services on the Internet, shows how other courts examine the proportionali-
ty of criminal copyright sanctions that have gone effectively unexamined in 
the United States.   
                                                          
 299.  But see Coenen, supra note 68, at 1000 n.32 (taking the position that penalty-sensitive 
free speech analysis need not result in a proportionality analysis, but rather that this failure to dis-
tinguish between levels of sanctions is a result of the categorical approach, and thus antithetical to 
it). 
 300.  Balganesh, supra note 155, at 1578. 
 301.  See supra Part I.A. 
 302.  See supra Part I.B. 
 303.  See, e.g., supra note 103. 
 304.  See supra Part I.B. 
 305.  See infra Appendix. 
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Two founders of the Pirate Bay application were convicted in Sweden 
of crimes in violation of the Copyright Act, sentenced to prison, and fined 
several million Euros.
306
  The ECHR recognized that the convictions inter-
fered with the right to freedom of expression.
307
  It found, however, that the 
convictions were prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim.
308
  The 
court then weighed the applicant’s interest in freedom of expression against 
the state’s interest in protecting the rights of copyright-holders.309  It found 
that the Swedish state benefits from a wide margin of appreciation—a def-
erential standard of review—because it was balancing competing inter-
ests.
310
  The ECHR concluded that the prison sentence and award of damag-
es could not be regarded as disproportionate, in large part because the ap-
applicants had not taken any action to remove torrent files despite having 
been urged to do so.
311
  Thus it declared the application inadmissible as ill 
founded.
312
  Notably, however, the court appeared to consider the fact that 
other enforcement measures had not worked, before declaring the prison 
sentence proportionate.
313
 
The scope of U.S. criminal copyright law demonstrates several failings 
of the categorical approach with regard to speech that falls outside of the 
First Amendment.  Judicial abdication through categorical reasoning has 
permitted an overactive legislature to pass disproportionately punitive laws 
impacting speech.
314
  Courts have few doctrinal options to use to declare 
copyright criminalization disproportionate.  Unscrutinized criminalization 
allows state surveillance and other speech-related abuse.  This dispropor-
tionate standard has begun to collide with public speech intuitions.
315
  Ef-
forts to spread the U.S. criminal regime internationally will fail if the re-
gime continues to be seen by the public as impinging on free speech.  Other 
regimes that use proportionality analysis should scrutinize the U.S. ap-
proach to criminal copyright law, recognizing that it contains implicit as-
sumptions about the relationship between copyright and freedom of speech. 
The United States itself may want to adopt features of proportionality 
analysis for speech that is currently considered outside the First Amend-
                                                          
 306.  Neij v. Sweden, App. No. 40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Feb 19, 2013), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-117513. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. at 10–11. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Id. at 11–12. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  See supra Part I. 
 315.  See supra Part III. 
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ment’s protection.  This would not be as inconsistent with current doctrine 
as it might first seem.  The Supreme Court recognized in Reno that crimi-
nalizing speech is problematic,
316
 and recognized in Stanley v. Georgia
317
 
that a state cannot use all enforcement methods at its disposal, even against 
categorically unprotected speech.
318
 
In cases where a legislature criminalizes speech that is categorically 
rejected from the First Amendment’s protection, U.S. courts should look 
closer to enforcement standards, instead of abdicating scrutiny.  Courts 
could give credence to the notion that criminalization is itself worth inspect-
ing, even for categorically unprotected speech.  Rather than employing ad 
hoc reasoning, courts could look, even within rational basis review, to how 
First Amendment doctrine maps onto existing bodies of pertinent law, such 
as criminalization theory, which describes when governments should crimi-
nalize acts instead of subjecting them to civil sanctions.  The Supreme 
Court has peered within categorically unprotected speech before, but with 
no apparent principles.  Using principled balancing, U.S. courts could ex-
amine whether and when criminalization is constitutionally permitted. 
There may be additional places in U.S. speech law for proportionality 
principles; this Article begins a larger project to determine when and where 
they might apply. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A surprising situation has developed in which the United States has es-
tablished a primitive copyright–free speech interface that it is now export-
ing to the rest of the world.  The free speech approach used in other coun-
tries is, perhaps unexpectedly, more adept at handling copyright law.  The 
U.S. exportation of its criminal copyright standard is also an exportation of 
its understanding that copyright enforcement should not be balanced against 
speech. 
The United States might take advantage of the insights from propor-
tionality analysis by importing a structured form of balancing back into 
First Amendment doctrine.  It is not the position of this Article that the First 
Amendment import balancing tests wholeheartedly, as many elements of 
the categorical approach are highly speech protective.  Importing balancing 
to analysis of speech currently abandoned by the First Amendment, howev-
er, could solve the problems addressed in this Article.  For the moment, the 
                                                          
 316.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 886 (1997) (“[W]e presume that governmental regula-
tion of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to en-
courage it.”). 
 317.  394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 318.  Id. at 559–60. 
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United States is becoming the clear world outlier on copyright enforcement, 
and this is indicative of a larger pathology in the way the United States 
handles free speech. 
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Appendix.  Piracy Statutes 
 Willful?  For Profit? Scale of 
Offense 
Remedies Pre-trial 
Seizure and 
Forfeiture 
Aiding 
and 
Abetting 
TRIPS319 Yes. Unclear: 
“piracy . . . on 
a commercial 
scale” 
Commercial 
scale 
Imprisonment 
and/or monetary 
fine, 
“consistently 
with the level of 
penalties 
applied for 
crimes of a 
corresponding 
gravity” 
No. Criminal 
forfeiture only.  
Seizure and 
forfeiture shall 
be available as a 
“remed[y]” 
(presumably 
after a trial and 
thus criminal 
forfeiture not 
civil), in 
“appropriate 
cases” where 
infringement 
was the 
“predominant 
use” of 
material.   
None  
U.S. Law: 
NET 
Act;320 
PRO-IP 
of 
2008.321 
Yes. None.  Just 
infringement 
of more than 
$1,000 in 180 
days.  Where 
there is a 
motive and no 
minimum, it is 
for 
commercial 
advantage or 
private 
financial gain, 
where private 
financial gain 
includes the 
receipt of 
anything of 
value. 
One work is 
enough. 
Imprisonment 
and fines 
Yes, established 
in the PRO-IP 
Act Sec.  
2323.322 “any 
property used, 
or intended to 
be used, in any 
manner . . . to 
commit or 
facilitate the 
commission of 
an offense” 
Removed 
from 
copyright 
law in 
1976; 
however, 
federal 
aiding and 
abetting 
statute (18 
U.S.C.  
§2) has 
been 
applied. 
                                                          
 319.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 184. 
 320.  No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). 
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 Willful?  For Profit? Scale of 
Offense 
Remedies Pre-trial 
Seizure and 
Forfeiture 
Aiding 
and 
Abetting 
ACTA323 Yes. “at least those 
carried out as 
commercial 
activities for 
direct or 
indirect 
economic or 
commercial 
advantage” 
“commer-
cial scale,” 
but includes 
“indirect 
economic  
. . . 
advantage” 
“imprison-ment 
as well as 
monetary fines 
sufficiently high 
to provide a 
deterrent . . . 
consistently 
with the level of 
penalties 
applied for 
crimes of a 
corresponding 
gravity” 
Probably: “its 
competent 
authorities have 
the authority to 
order the 
seizure of . . . 
any related 
materials and 
implements 
used in the 
commission of 
the alleged 
offence”324 and 
“its competent 
authorities have 
the authority to 
order the 
forfeiture or 
destruction of 
all counterfeit 
trademark 
goods or pirated 
copyright 
goods.”325 No 
word of these 
forfeitures 
being after trial. 
States 
must 
crimina-
lize aiding 
and 
abetting of 
copyright 
infringe-
ment.326 
Legal 
persons 
(compa-
nies) must 
be held 
liable for 
criminal 
infringe-
ment and 
aiding and 
abetting.327 
 
  
                                                          
 321.  Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property (PRO-IP) Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-403, 112 Stat. 4256, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
110publ403/pdf/PLAW-110publ403.pdf. 
 322.  Id. § 206(a) (quoting Section 2323 of the PRO-IP Act). 
 323.  See supra  note 258, at art. 23(1).  
 324.  Id. at art. 25(1). 
 325.  Id. at art. 25(3). 
 326.  Id. at art. 23(4). 
 327.  Id. at art. 23(5). 
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 Willful?  For Profit? Scale of 
Offense 
Remedies Pre-trial 
Seizure and 
Forfeiture 
Aiding 
and 
Abetting 
CAFTA
328 
Yes. None, and 
need not be 
significant in 
size.  
“[W]illful 
infringe-ments 
that have no 
direct or 
indirect 
motivation of 
financial gain, 
provided that 
there is more 
than a de 
minimis 
financial 
harm.” 
“commer-
cial scale 
includes 
significant 
willful 
infringe-
ments of 
copyright or 
related 
rights, for 
purposes of 
commercial 
advantage or 
private 
financial 
gain, as well 
as willful 
infringe-
ments that 
have no 
direct or 
indirect 
motivation of 
financial 
gain, 
provided that 
there is more 
than a de 
minimis 
financial 
harm” 
“imprisonment 
or monetary 
fines, or both, 
sufficient to 
provide a 
deterrent to 
future acts of 
infringement” 
“its judicial 
authorities shall 
have the 
authority to 
order the 
seizure of 
suspected 
counterfeit or 
pirated goods, 
any related 
materials and 
implements that 
have been used 
in the 
commission of 
the offense, any 
assets traceable 
to the infringing 
activity, and 
any 
documentary 
evidence 
relevant to the 
offense.  Each 
Party shall 
provide that 
items that are 
subject to 
seizure pursuant 
to any such 
judicial order 
need not be 
individually 
identified so 
long as they fall 
within general 
categories 
specified in the 
order.” 
None. 
                                                          
 328.  CAFTA, supra note 257. 
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 Willful?  For Profit? Scale of 
Offense 
Remedies Pre-trial 
Seizure and 
Forfeiture 
Aiding 
and 
Abetting 
FTA- 
Australia
329 
Yes. None, if 
“significant 
wilful 
infringements 
 . . . that have 
no direct or 
indirect 
motivation of 
financial 
gain”330 
“[C]ommerci
al scale” is 
defined as 
including 
“willful 
infringe-
ments for the 
purposes of 
commercial 
advantage or 
financial 
gain.”331 
Note that this 
does not 
include 
private 
financial 
gain, but 
does define 
financial 
gain broadly 
as including 
indirect gain. 
Imprisonment 
and monetary 
fines 
“sufficiently 
high to provide 
a deterrent to 
infringement” 
Probably: 
“judicial 
authorities shall 
have the 
authority to 
order the 
seizure of 
suspected . . . 
goods, any 
related 
materials and 
implements that 
have been used 
in the 
commission of 
the offence”332 
No aiding 
and 
abetting 
                                                          
 329.  Australia FTA, supra note 261. 
 330.  Id. at art. 26(a)(i). 
 331.  Id. at art. 26(a)(ii). 
 332.  Id. at art. 26(b). 
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 Willful?  For Profit? Scale of 
Offense 
Remedies Pre-trial 
Seizure and 
Forfeiture 
Aiding 
and 
Abetting 
FTA- 
Chile333 
Yes. None, if 
significant 
infringement  
“significant 
aggregate 
monetary 
value, 
calculated 
based on the 
legitimate 
retail value of 
the infringed 
goods”334 
“[C]ommer-
cial scale” is 
defined as 
including 
infringe-
ment done 
“for a 
commercial 
advantage or 
financial 
gain.”  Note 
that this is 
not private 
financial 
gain.  Crucial 
footnote 34 
excludes de 
minimis 
infringe-
ments and 
mentions 
prosecu-
torial 
discretion.335 
“Imprisonment 
and/or monetary 
fines that are 
sufficient to 
provide a 
deterrent to 
future 
infringements 
and present a 
level of 
punishment 
consistent with 
the gravity of 
the offense”336 
Probably: 
“judicial 
authorities have 
the authority to 
order the 
seizure of 
suspected . . . 
pirated goods 
. . . assets 
legally traceable 
to the infringing 
activity. . . and 
implements that 
constitute 
evidence of the 
offense.337 
No aiding 
and 
abetting 
                                                          
 333.  Chile FTA, supra note 261. 
 334.  Id. at art. 22(a)(ii). 
 335.  Id. at art. 22(a)(i) n.34. 
 336.  Id. at art. 22(b). 
 337.  Id. at art. 22(c). 
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 Willful?  For Profit? Scale of 
Offense 
Remedies Pre-trial 
Seizure and 
Forfeiture 
Aiding 
and 
Abetting 
FTA –
Colum-
bia338 
Yes. None, if 
significant 
infringement  
“significant 
willful . . . 
infringements 
that have no 
direct or 
indirect 
motivation of 
financial gain” 
and “willful 
infringements 
for purposes 
of commercial 
advantage or 
private 
financial 
gain”339 
“Commer-
cial scale” 
but defined 
as 
“significant” 
OR infringe-
ments done 
“for purposes 
of . . . private 
financial 
gain,” 
effectively 
getting rid of 
“commer-
cial scale.”340 
“Imprisonment 
as well as 
monetary fines 
sufficient to 
provide a 
deterrent to 
future 
infringements”
341 
Probably: 
“judicial 
authorities shall 
have the 
authority to 
order the 
seizure of 
suspected . . . 
pirated goods, 
any related 
materials and 
implements that 
have been used 
in the 
commission of 
the offense”.  
Using the word 
“suspected” 
indicates this is 
pre-trial. 
No aiding 
and 
abetting 
 
 
                                                          
 338.  U.S.-Columbia Free Trade Agreement, ch. 16, Nov. 22, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text. 
 339.  Id. at art. 26. 
 340.  Id. 
 341.  Id. at art. 27(a). 
